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REVOLUTION WITHOUT REFORM? A CRITIQUE OF
EGYPT'S ELECTION LAWS
SAHAR F. Aziz*
ABSTRACT
This Article compares Egypt's election laws before and after the Janu-
ary 25 Revolution to determine whether the changes are sufficient to pro-
duce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. This Article concludes
that Egyptian elections processes and institutions remain insufficiently
transparent, fail to produce results reflecting the diversity within Egyp-
tian society, and fail to offer all Egyptians-especially women and relig-
ious minorities-an equal opportunity to actively participate in
governance of their country.
The Article critically assesses recent changes in Egypt's electoral regime
and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The the-
sis is twofold. First, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for
Egyptian women and Coptics to be elected to office, thereby further
marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are
troubling in light of the significant contributions Egyptian women and
Coptics made to the revolution. Second, the limited post-revolution
reforms made to election laws are insufficient to produce the sustainable
and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolu-
tion laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facili-
tate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in
election outcomes.
Nonetheless, in this early stage of the post-revolutionary phase, there is
reason for cautious optimism. While Egyptian election laws have been
amended for the better since the revolution, more legislative reforms are
needed to ensure that future elections are fair, free, and accessible to all
Egyptians. Sound election laws are the bedrock of a democracy insofar as
they ensure that a dominant party does not extend its rule against the
will of the people. As witnessed with the National Democratic Party
under the Mubarak regime, laws can be manipulated to guarantee cer-
tain electoral outcomes benefitting the dominant party.
* Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan School of Law. Member of the Texas and the
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In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from
entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian
cultural and religious norms. One year after their historic revolution,
Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether
post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete
upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or
merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine
the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the
outcome, one thing is quite clear-future political leaders who seek to
impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Revolution without reform is meaningless.' In the case of Egypt,
its people overcame decades of fear and oppression and sacrificed
their lives for more than merely overthrowing a dictator. Rather,
Egyptians sought to upend an entrenched system of cronyism, nep-
otism, and pervasive corruption that squandered the future of an
entire generation. Millions of youth protested in droves, demand-
ing reforms to the dilapidated education system that required stu-
dents to bribe public teachers to teach, expressing rage at their
inability to obtain employment despite their college degrees, and
calling attention to the troubling rise of poverty that was paralyzing
their future.2 Over the course of a historic eighteen-day revolu-
tion, beginning on January 25, 2011 (the January 25 Revolution),-
millions of Egyptians took great risks to demand a complete
upheaval of the broken system that had failed them.
1. Chibli Mallat et al., Revising Egypt's Constitution: A Contribution to the Constitutional
Amendment Debate, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 182, 183 (2011) ("A constitutional transition
after the ousting of the dictator is the most important task for sealing in law the future of
Egypt and the region and for ensuring peaceful political change.").
2. See, e.g., Dina Shehata, The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an
End, FOREIGN Ajy., May-June 2011, at 26, 26-29 (noting that youth unemployment is high-
est among those with more education); Raghda El Halawany, A Lesson Learnt the Hard Way
in Egypt, GULF NEWS (Dec. 17, 2010), http://gulfnews.com/news/region/egypt/a-lesson-
learnt-the-hard-way-in-egypt-1.729820 (reporting the number of Egyptian students that sup-
plement their education with private tutoring because it is the only way to ensure high
performance on exams).
3. See Shehata, supra note 2, at 28-31.
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In a mere eighteen days, Egyptians overthrew the oppressive
yoke of a thirty-year despot and dismembered Hosni Mubarak's
corrupt National Democratic Party (NDP) .4 This is just the first
step on a long path towards meaningful reform, without which
Egypt's January 25 Revolution will be but a glimmer of light in
Egypt's long history of authoritarianism. The fight for Egypt's
future has now moved from the streets to the mechanisms and
structures that promote self-governance, government transparency
and accountability, and a society governed by the rule of law.5
Most recently, the revolution has moved to the courts as the Mus-
lim Brotherhood 6 and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF)-which assumed executive power for eighteen months in
Egypt following Mubarak's fall-compete to co-opt the judiciary to
execute their respective agendas.7 For example, Egyptians viewed
with suspicion the Supreme Constitutional Court's (SCC) 8June 12,
2012, ruling calling for the dissolution of a Muslim Brotherhood-
dominated parliament.9 Many Egyptians suspected the SCAF had
improperly meddled with the Court's deliberations.10 Regardless
4. See id. at 26-27, 29-32.
5. See Mallat et al., supra note 1 at 183-84, 187.
6. The Muslim Brotherhood began as a social and political movement in 1928 that
initially accepted the use of violence to implement its political and religious ideology
wherein government policies and practices are based on Islamic principles and values. See
Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, BBC (June 26, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-12313405. During the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood denounced vio-
lence as a political tool and instead attempted to work through the political system as
another stakeholder in the political process. See id. Following Mubarak's resignation in
February 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party and ran
political candidates for parliament. See id. After decades of state sponsored suppression,
detention, and torture of Muslim Brotherhood officials, the Freedom and Justice Party
won nearly half of the seats in the People's Assembly in the first post-revolution parliamen-
tary elections, and their 2012 presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsi, was elected to the
presidency. See id.
7. David D. Kirkpatrick, Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt's Parliament, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-
political-showdown-in-egypt-as-court-invalidates-parliament.html (discussing Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces' (SCAF) possible involvement in the Supreme Constitutional
Court's (SCC) ruling to dissolve parliament).
8. The SCC serves as the highest court of the land in Egypt. Mohamed S.E. Abdel
Wahab, An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research, § 6.2, GLOBALEX (Oct.
2012), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Egyptl.htm. The Court is empowered to:
(1) determine the constitutionality of laws and regulations; (2) decide on jurisdiction dis-
putes between judicial bodies; and (3) interpret the laws issued by the Legislative Authority
and the decrees issued by the Head of the State in case of any divergence with respect to
their implementation. Id.
9. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 7 (reporting that the SCC's ruling to dissolve parlia-
ment was "condemned as a 'coup' by Islamists, liberals and scholars").
10. See id.
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of the veracity of such claims, the SCC's credibility and indepen-
dence has been called into question. Indeed, in an act of defiance,
President Morsi directly challenged the ruling by instructing the
parliament to resume its work." Meanwhile, Morsi appealed the
SCC's decision to the Highest Administrative Court (HAC).12
Although the HAC dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as
required by law, the case triggered increased suspicions about the
independence of the judiciary and more specifically the sitting
judges' loyalties to the former Mubarak regime and the SCAF. 1 3
This Article examines the recent changes to Egypt's electoral
regime in order to assess whether Egypt is experiencing a revolu-
tion without reform or a revolution that is shifting the country's
trajectory towards a meaningful democracy. The Article's thesis is
twofold. First, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects
for Egyptian women and Coptics (Copts) to be elected to office,
thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere.14 Such
adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant con-
tributions Egyptian women and Copts made during the revolution.
Second, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution
are insufficient to produce the sustainable democracy sought by
Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create an adequately
transparent and independent process that facilitates a level playing
field among candidates and voter confidence in the political
system.15
11. Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, Egyptian Parliament to Convene Tuesday, Official Says, CNN
(July 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/08/world/meast/egypt-politics/index.html
(explaining that Morsi's order to reinstate parliament puts him at odds with the SCAF).
12. INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL Sys., ELECTIONS IN EcYPT: IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT
COURT DECISIONS ON ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 7 (2012), available at http://www.ifes.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/Egypt.SCC Decisions August9.
pdf (explaining the process of appeals surrounding the dissolution of parliament).
13. See id.; Kirkpatrick, supra note 7.
14. In a statement, U.S. Ambassador for Global Women's Issues Melanne Verveer said
the following:
[I]n Egypt women have pretty much been precluded from even the transitional
governance that has been going on there. There has been a taking back of the
quota that would have had more women in the parliament. And there is the
potential that so much of the progress that they have made will be rolled back.
Amar C. Bakshi, Global Women's Ambassador on the Arab Spring, Islam, Politics and Contracep-
tion, CNN WORLD (Mar. 8, 2012), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/08/
state-department-official-defends-access-to-family-planning-abroad/.
15. See, e.g., Leila Fadel & Ingy Hassieb, Official Results Confirm Egyptians Face a Stark
Choice in Presidential Election, WASH. PosT (May 29, 2012), http://wvw.washingtonpost.
com/world/middle east/official-results-confirm-egyptians-face-a-stark-choice/2012/05/
28/gQA30fxwU-story.html (expressing concerns with voter rigging and improper inter-
ference by the military in favor of Ahmed Shafiq).
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In this early stage of the post-revolutionary phase, there is reason
for cautious optimism. However, while Egyptian election laws have
been amended for the better since the revolution, more legislative
reforms are needed to ensure that future elections are fair, free,
and accessible to all Egyptians.16 Sound election laws are the bed-
rock of a democracy insofar as they ensure that a dominant party
does not extend its rule against the will of the people. As witnessed
with the NDP under the Mubarak regime, laws can be manipulated
to guarantee certain electoral outcomes that further entrench the
dominant party.' 7
Accordingly, this Article posits that post-revolution amendments
to Egypt's election laws, while a step in the right direction, remain
insufficient to produce a society where parliament represents all
Egyptians, including women and Copts. The Article examines how
the laws governing elections for the lower house of parliament (the
People's Assembly), the upper house of parliament (the Shura
Council), and the president affect the citizenry's ability to monitor
elections and challenge electoral irregularities. Integral to this
examination is a critique of the laws that govern Egypt's two elec-
tion monitoring and regulation oversight authorities-the High
Elections Commission (HEC) and the Presidential Elections Com-
mission (PEC).
This Article compares the laws before and after the revolution to
determine whether the changes implemented thus far are suffi-
16. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 185-86 ("[SCAF] aspires to guarantee a peaceful
transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows for the assumption
of authority by a civilian and elected authority to govern the country and the building of a
democratic and free state.") (statement by SCAF in its Communique Number 4 on Febru-
ary 12, 2011).
17. See, e.g., Heba Saleh, Egyptian Steel Magnate jailed for Corruption, FIN. TIMES (Sept.
15, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8dc45cO6-dfa2-11e0-845a-00144feabdcO.html#
axzzloGct3i3L (highlighting the case of Ahmed Ezz, who monopolized the steel industry
by holding more than 60% of the market share). Ahmed Ezz was a close associate of
Gamal Mubarak, the influential son of the former president who was widely seen to be
preparing to succeed his father. Id. Commentators often described him as "the engineer
of succession"-a reference to his presumed role in preparing the grounds for the son's
political ambitions. Id. In 2011, an Egyptian Criminal Court sentenced Ezz to ten years in
prison on corruption charges. Mohamed A. Arafa, Towards a Culture for Accountability: A
New Dawn for Egypt, 5 PHOENIx L. REv. 1, 12 n.60 (2011). In 2012, he was convicted before
a second Egyptian Criminal Court on charges of money laundering and sentenced to an
additional seven years in prison and fined nearly twenty billion Egyptian pounds (approxi-
mately three billion dollars). Egyptian Steel Magnate Ahmed Ezz Convicted, BBC (Oct. 4,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19830922; see also Mallat et al., supra
note 1, at 182, 184 (highlighting Mubarak's use of Article 139 on January 29, 2011 to
appoint a vice-president after three decades of not having one to preempt the Speaker of
the People's Assembly from using Article 84 to demote Mubarak from the presidency).
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cient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. At first
blush, some of the post-revolution changes appear constructive;
however, a more in-depth analysis reveals the structural flaws in the
purported reforms. A prime example is the transition of the HEC
and PEC's membership tojudges.' 8 Whilejudges are preferable to
politicians, who were historically handpicked by the former NDP,
their immersion into the trenches of the electoral process jeopar-
dizes their independence. Rather than serving as front line arbitra-
tors in partisan electoral disputes, judges should be limited to
reviewing decisions issued by independent elections commissions.
Judicial review can be one of the many checks that ensure the elec-
tions commissions are in fact independent. Moreover, appellate
review of HEC and PEC findings may be viewed as less credible
when it involves review of fellow judges' announcements of elec-
tion results as opposed to an independent election commission.' 9
The Article concludes that Egyptian electoral processes remain
insufficiently transparent, fail to produce results reflecting the
diversity within Egyptian society, and fail to offer all Egyptians,
especially women and religious minorities, an equal opportunity to
actively participate in governance of their country.
II. SUMMARY OF EGYPTIAN ELECTION LAWS AND THE
ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK
Four statutory laws and two constitutional provisions govern
Egypt's complicated electoral process. 20 Article 88 of the abro-
gated 1971 Egyptian Constitution, as adopted and amended in
Article 39 of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration, establishes the
legal framework for Egypt's electoral system. 21 Article 39 stipulates
18. See infra Parts III.B, III.F for a detailed discussion of the post-revolution changes
to the HEC and PEC, respectfully.
19. FOUTOUH EL CHAZLI & KARIM EL CHAZLI, EURO-MEDITERRANEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
NETWORK, EGYPT: THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 27-29 (Susan Sharpe trans., 2010)
(noting some reform-minded judges' fears prior to the revolution that the falsification of
electoral results would make people lose confidence in the judiciary if the judges were
constitutionally obliged to oversee the electoral process).
20. See generally DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF Ecwr's
ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 4-7, 9-27 (2011) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, COM-
PREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT] (describing post-revolution changes to Egyptian election law
through July 11, 2011 in detail).
21. See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 39, Mar.
30, 2011 [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION], translated in Constitutional Declaration
2011, EGYPTIAN Gov'T SERVS. PORTAL, Www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/
default.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (adopting Article 88 in part); CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 88, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005,
March 26, 2007.
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"the law shall determine the conditions that must be met for mem-
bers of the People's Assembly and Shura Council and shall stipu-
late electoral and referenda provisions." 22 It mandates passage of
legislation that regulates the electoral process, including the estab-
lishment of the HEC to supervise parliamentary elections.2 3 Simi-
larly, Article 76 of the abrogated 1971 Egyptian Constitution, as
amended in 2005 and adopted in part as Article 28 of the 2011
Constitutional Declaration, establishes the PEC to supervise presi-
dential elections. 24 Laws No. 173 and 174 of 2005 delineate the
authority the HEC and PEC, respectively, as supervisory electoral
bodies.25 In addition, Law No. 38 of 1972 governs elections to the
People's Assembly,26 while Law No. 73 of 1956 defines voter rights
and responsibilities.27
This constitutional framework was dissolved when the SCAF sus-
pended Egypt's 1971 Constitution on February 13, 2011.28 In its
place, the SCAF adopted a Constitutional Declaration on March
30, 2011, which serves as Egypt's interim constitution until a new
one is drafted by a one-hundred-member constitutional committee
selected by parliament.2 9 The Constitutional Declaration adopts
22. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 39.
23. See id.; INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL Sys., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: STRUCTURE AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, AND OTHER ISSUES CONCERNING
ELECTORAL OPERATIONS 2-3 (2011), available at http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publica-
tions/White-Papers/201 1 /-/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/201 1/
2011_Egypt.Briefing.PaperIIIPoliticalRights.pdf [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION] (explaining that the High Elections
Commission (HEC) is responsible for elections of the People's Assembly and the Shura
Council and referenda, as established through legislation in Article 3 bis of Law 73/1956).
24. Kristen A. Stilt, Constitutional Authority and Subversion: Egypt's New Presidential Elec-
tion System, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 335, 343-44 (2006).
25. Id. at 350, 353, 363-65. Law No. 173 of 2005 replaced the previous law regulating
the HEC, Law No. 73 of 1956. See id. at 353 n.78.
26. See Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-farida Al-Rasmiyya,
28 Sept. 1972 (Egypt).
27. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 9.
28. Nathan J. Brown & Kristen Stilt, A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Apr. 11, 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/
11/haphazard-constitutional-compromise/2ql (criticizing SCAF for unilaterally abrogat-
ing the 1971 Constitution through an announcement on Facebook despite a referendum
held two weeks earlier that approved eight amendments to the 1971 Constitution instead
of abrogating it completely); Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 182, 184 (discussing SCAF's
proclamation announcing that it was suspending the Constitution and governing the coun-
try for six months or until elections were held for the People's Assembly, Shura Council,
and President); see also Arafa, supra note 17, at 18-21.
29. For an in-depth analysis of the Constitutional Declaration, see Brown & Stilt, supra
note 28. See also NATHAN BROWN, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, CONSTITUTIONAL REBIRTH: TUNISIA
AND EGYP-r RECONSTRUCT THEMSELVES 5-7, 12-14, 17-20 (2011), available at http://www.
arab-hdr.org/publications/ahdr/Tunisia&Egypt.pdf. For an in-depth analysis of the Tem-
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Articles 39 and 76, among others, of the abrogated 1971 Constitu-
tion as Articles 39 and 27-28, respectfully, thus leaving intact the
pre-revolution electoral framework and attendant laws.3 0  It is
worth noting that the Constitutional Declaration was unilaterally
issued by the SCAF absent any public debate on the numerous pro-
visions not included in Egypt's March 2011 public referendum.3 '
Notwithstanding the serious legitimacy concerns arising from such
an undemocratic process, Egyptians have begrudgingly accepted it
with the understanding that a new constitution will soon replace it
through a democratic process.32 While the legitimacy of the Con-
stitutional Declaration is relevant to electoral laws, it is beyond the
scope of this Article, and thus will not be addressed in depth.3 3
Much of the debate about post-revolution elections reform is
centered on amendments to four laws governing elections and
elections monitoring.34 Accordingly, Part III of this Article
describes post-revolution changes to these laws to provide the
reader a comparative framework with which to assess Egypt's elec-
toral system. Part W then provides a critique of these post-revolu-
tion changes as a segue to specific recommendations for further
poral Constitutional Declaration and the eight constitutional amendments, see Arafa, supra
note 17, at 18-21. But see CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 60B (authoriz-
ing SCAF to appoint the constitutional committee and "if the constituent assembly
encounters an obstacle that would prevent it from completing its work, the SCAF within a
week will form a new constituent assembly to author a new constitution within three
months from the day of the new assembly's formation").
30. See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21 (adopting Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 8,
40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76 (in
part)), 77 (in part), 88 (in part), 148 (in part), 189 (in part)).
31. Michael Wahid Hanna, MappingEgypt's Electorate, FOREIGN POLICY (May 15, 2012),
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/15/mapping-egyptselectorate (offer-
ing context for the public's growing impatience with the transition and the illegitimacy
and undemocratic adoption of the SCAF's March 2011 Constitutional Declaration); see also
Kristina Kausch, The Muslim Brotherhood, Post-Election Scenarios and Policy Options in Egypt: A
European Perspective, in E.U. INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, EGYPTIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD 6, 10 (Esra Bulut Aymat ed., 2011) (reporting that SCAF's adoption by
decree of new electoral legislation contradictory to amendments approved by the referen-
dum without any consultation led to a public outcry by political groups and parties).
32. Kausch, supra note 31, at 10.
33. Id.; see also Donald J. Kochan, You Say You Want a (Nonviolent) Revolution, Well Then
What? Translating Western Thought and Institution Building for Freedom in Governments Emerging
Out of Peaceful Chaos, 114 W. VA. L. REv. 897, 902 (2011) (stating that one risk is that
democratic elections do not follow a nonviolent revolution and instead some
nondemocratic regime emerges).
34. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 188 (arguing that either the Constitutional Amend-
ment Committee or the SCAF should be encouraged to confirm that the transition to
democracy and the holding of free and fair elections will be led by the judiciary).
92013]
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reforms necessary to transform elections into a fully transparent,
fair, and accessible process for all Egyptians.
While post-revolution changes to election laws are an improve-
ment, they fail to ensure religious minorities and women are ade-
quately represented in elected office in accordance with its
international commitments.3 5 Egypt is a state party to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the UN Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), and the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights. 3 6 By signing these treaties, Egypt has committed to
providing equal opportunity for women and minorities to get
elected into office.3 7 Specifically, Article 7 of CEDAW obligates
Egypt to:
[Tiake all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the political and public life of the country
and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with
men, the right:
(b) to participate in the formulation of government policy and
the implementation thereof and to hold public office and per-
form all public functions at all levels of government.38
In February 2010, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination Against Women, in its concluding observations called
on Egypt "to adopt temporary special measures . . . in order to
accelerate the full and equal participation of women in public and
political life . . . [and] to take the necessary measures to secure the
participation of women in the various phases of the electoral pro-
cess," and "to modify, or repeal, without delay and within a clear
35. Khaled A. Beydoun, Fast Tracking Women into Parliamentary Seats in the Arab World,
17 Sw.J. INT'L L. 63, 73 (2011) (referencing the opposition and ultimate elimination of the
quota for women in post-revolution parliament seats).
36. Ratification ofInternational Human Rights Treaties: Egypt, U. MINN. Hum. RTs. LIBR.,
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-egypt.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2013).
37. For example, Article 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) states the following:
[P]arties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic and
cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure the full
development and advancement of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them
the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a
basis of equality with men.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 3, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). Egypt became a signatory party to
CEDAW on July 16, 1980. Id.
38. Id. art. 7.
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time frame, discriminatory legislation."3 In response, Egypt
adopted a quota to appoint sixty-four women in the People's
Assembly, as discussed in more detail in Part IV(A) (1).
In addition, current laws fail to create a transparent and inde-
pendent process that facilitates a level playing field and voter confi-
dence in the system. 40 Thus, the record high voter turnout for the
2011 and 2012 parliamentary elections, attributed mostly to the
optimism from Egypt's historic revolution, is likely to decline as
enthusiasm fades and Egyptians embark on the difficult project of
nation-building and navigating the transition to democracy.41
Accordingly, the parliament should reform the laws to ensure all
Egyptians are fully enfranchised and have an equal opportunity to
partake in political life.
III. A COMPAIUSON OF ELECTION LAWS BEFORE AND AFTER THE
JANUARY 25 REVOLUTION
For the most part, Egypt's pre-revolution electoral system
remains intact. The electoral system that allowed Mubarak and the
NDP to retain a three-decade grip on power continues to deter-
mine how the president and members of parliament are elected.4 2
Despite repeated calls for systemic changes to Egypt's electoral
framework, 4 3 the SCAF has limited reforms to minor, incremental
changes. 44 While any progress towards reforming Egypt's laws is a
39. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, para. 16, 30, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/Egy/Co/7 (Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter
Concluding Observations].
40. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 184 (arguing for transparency).
41. Stilt, supra note 24, at 337; Frank Richardson, Rule of Law: An Elusive Panacea,
INT'L BAR Ass'N, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=e780194c-fa5 8 -47
27-a964-19945729c282 (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 183 ("All
Egyptians in good faith, and those who support them on the bumpy and difficult road to
democracy, are seeking to build institutional change into the neglected and distorted
promise of the Constitution.").
42. Stilt, supra note 24, at 335-36 (discussing the leverage Mubarak had in the elec-
tions based on the election laws that he helped draft).
43. Khalil Al-Anani, Egypt's Souring Transition, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/khalil-al-anany/egypt%E2%80%99s-souring-transition;
Egypt Panel Proposes Limit to Presidential Term, AL ARABYA NEWS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.
alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/26/139356.html (noting that SCAF instructed Constitu-
tional Amendment Committee to "amend all articles as it sees fit to guarantee democracy
and the integrity of presidential and parliamentary elections" in reforming the 1971 Con-
stitution); Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 190.
44. See Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya,
28 Sept. 1972 (Egypt); Decree Law No. 120 of 2011 (To Amend Provisions of Law No. 38 of
1972 on the People's Assembly and Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council), 27 Sept.
2011 (Egypt).
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welcome change after three decades of stagnation, current post-
revolution reforms do not go far enough. The entities tasked with
election oversight and monitoring still lack sufficient indepen-
dence and authority to function in a manner that ensures all Egyp-
tians are adequately represented in the parliament. 45 As such,
current election laws adversely affect women and religious minori-
ties by denying them meaningful opportunities to be elected to the
parliament. Accordingly, this Section provides a comparative
framework through which to examine pre- and post-revolution
election laws.
Section A summarizes the pre-revolution laws regarding voters'
political rights and the role of the HEC in monitoring parliamen-
tary elections. Section B summarizes the post-revolution amend-
ments to these laws and their impact on election transparency,
accessibility, and oversight of the electoral process. Of the various
post-revolution changes to election laws, those pertaining to the
HEC are arguably the most progressive towards ensuring indepen-
dent elections oversight-a crucial prerequisite for avoiding abuse
by prospective dominant parties.
Sections C and D analyze how post-revolution amendments
changed the process by which candidates run for office. While
some of the most significant shortcomings in the laws remain
unchanged, the introduction of a closed list system 46 steers voters
towards electing political parties that presumably select candidates
competent to hold office, if only to increase the chances of the
political party winning the next election. This is a welcome change
in a country where political office historically went to those with
wealth and political connections, instead of experienced candi-
dates committed to public service.
Section E compares the pre- and post-revolution laws governing
Shura Council elections to illustrate the minimal changes made to
Law No. 120 of 1980. Due to a lack of legislative authority, the
Shura Council is often criticized as an unnecessary, elitist institu-
tion.4 7 It remains to be seen whether the Shura Council will transi-
tion into a traditional higher chamber of parliament that works in
conjunction with the lower house to promulgate laws. 4 8
45. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 29.
46. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 20-22
(noting and elaborating on introduction and complications of the closed list system).
47. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 203.
48. At the time of the writing of this Article, reforming the Shura Council is not a
priority in Egypt's national reform agenda. Brown & Stilt, supra note 28 ("The declaration
also keeps the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), the upper house of the Egyptian
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Sections F and G examine the presidential nomination and elec-
tion process in place before and after the January 25 Revolution,
respectively. For over three decades, the laws governing this pro-
cess highly favored the ruling NDP, virtually guaranteeing each
Mubarak victory.49
A. Political Rights and the High Elections Commission before the
Revolution-Law No. 73 of 1956
In 1952, a military committee of junior army officers, known as
the "Free Officers Movement," overthrew the monarchy of King
Farouk, ending nearly a century of British colonial rule and usher-
ing in a new era in modern Egyptian politics.50 The Free Officers
Movement, led by Lieutenant General Mohamed Naguib and sub-
sequently by Gamal Abdel-Nasser, imposed a new Egyptian Consti-
tution in 1956.51 The 1956 Constitution established a republican
system of government with a "National Assembly" as its unicameral
parliament.52
The National Assembly passed Law No. 73 of 1956, which defines
the rights and responsibilities of citizens and government entities
in the electoral process.53 Law No. 73 of 1956 also establishes the
HEC.5 4 The HEC is a public institution legally recognized as a
parliament created in 1980 with few functions other than to serve as a check on the lower
People's Assembly in the unlikely event it began to show independence. And yet the decla-
ration does not include the list of legislative areas that require the Consultative Council's
approval before the People's Assembly can act, suggesting the Council has no binding
power vis-A-vis the People's Assembly.").
49. Stilt, supra note 24, at 348-53 (detailing the ways Mubarak and the National Dem-
ocratic Party (NDP) entrenched the presidential election process via the ways to become a
candidate and election monitoring).
50. See Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt, 28 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 883, 888 (2003). The British colonized Egypt in 1882. See Richardson,
supra note 41.
51. See MICHELE DUNNE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, EVALUATING EGYP-
TIAN REFORM 4 (2006), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP66.
Dunne.FINAL.pdf.
52. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 June 1956. The National
Assembly was subsequently turned into a bicameral parliament following the enactment of
Law No. 120 of 1980, creating the upper-house Shura Council. See Law No. 120 of 1980
(Concerning the Shura Council), Al-Jaida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 July 1980 (Egypt).
53. Law No. 73 of 1956 (Concerning the Exercise of Political Rights), Al-Jaida Al-
Rasmiyya (Egypt).
54. Article 1 of Law No. 73 of 1956 grants all Egyptians age eighteen years and older,
except those serving as police and military personnel, the right and duty to vote in all
presidential, parliamentary, and local council elections. Id. art. 1. Article 2 prohibits cer-
tain persons from voting, including persons (1) convicted of a criminal act, unless they
have been rehabilitated; (2) whose property was confiscated under a judgment by the
Court of Ethics, for a period of five years after issuance of the confiscation order; (3)
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juridical person domiciled in Cairo.55 The HEC supervises elec-
tions of the People's Assembly, Shura Council, and national refer-
enda.56 In theory, the HEC is supposed to serve as an independent
body comprised of judges and politically unaffiliated individuals
who ensure that parliamentary elections are free, fair, and trans-
parent. Pursuant to this mandate, the HEC's pre-revolution
authority included: (1) promulgating rules for developing election
rosters and their revision, screening, and updating methods; (2)
recommending rules for determining electoral constituencies; (3)
promulgating general rules for regulating election campaigns; (4)
increasing public awareness and orientation efforts pertaining to
elections; (5) developing guidelines for the electoral process; (6)
monitoring compliance with codes of ethics related to elections;
(7) declaring the results of elections and referenda; and (8) issuing
opinions on draft laws relating to elections.5 7
Before the revolution, the HEC was comprised of the following
members: (1) the Minister of Interior, as chair; (2) three serving
members of the judiciary with a rank of deputy heads of the
Supreme Court of Cassation or its equivalent; and (3) six public
figures not affiliated with any political parties, four of whom are
chosen by the People's Assembly, including at least two former
members of the judiciary.5 8 The High Judicial Council selected the
three serving judiciary members and three additional equally
ranked judges as reserve members.59 The Shura Council selected
the final two members, at least one of whom had to be a former
member of the judiciary.60 Both chambers of parliament selected
six public figures as reserve members, according to the criteria set
for the serving members. 6 ' All six individuals served a six-year
sentenced to prison for specified crimes; and (4) dismissed from the civil service or public
sector "for disgraceful reasons," for a period of five years after dismissal. Id. art. 2. Article
3 suspends the political rights of persons (1) placed under interdiction; (2) treated for
mental illnesses, during their treatment; or (3) declared bankrupt, for five years as of the
date of declaration, unless they were previously rehabilitated. Id. art. 3.
55. Id. art. 3(bis) (a).
56. Id. art. 3(bis) (f) (1).
57. Stilt, supra note 24, at 364-65.
58. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT: ASSESSMENT OF THE
ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 26 (2007) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, THE ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Law No. 73 of 1956 (Concerning the Exercise of Political Rights), Al-jarida Al
Rasmiyya, art. 3(bis) (Egypt).
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term. 62 The six public figures were historically loyalists to the NDP
whose partisanship undermined the credibility of the HEC.6 3
After significant pressure from civil society organizations and a
landmark SCC ruling in 2000 that mandated judicial supervision of
elections, 64 Egyptian parliamentary elections were required by law
to be monitored by judges.65 Not to be thwarted by the SCC, the
Mubarak regime assigned oversight of the judicial monitors to the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, both directly con-
trolled by the executive. 6 6 To make matters worse, the judicial per-
sonnel assigned to monitor polling stations were from the
prosecutor's office and the State Lawsuits Authority, both of which
are controlled by the executive branch.67 Thus, the executive
branch sought to use the judiciary's reputation and prestige to vali-
date sham elections.68 Based on this checkered history, the mem-
bership of the HEC was overhauled after the revolution to make it
a purely judicially-run entity that oversaw other judges monitoring
the polls. 69
Pre-revolution, Law No. 73 of 1956 required the HEC to estab-
lish a permanent Technical Secretariat with an independent
budget whose "terms of reference" (i.e., its structure and objec-
tives) are determined by the HEC chair.70 The HEC's Technical
Secretariat held significant influence because it reviewed nomina-
tion applications and vetted potential candidates to ensure they
met the legal requirements for running in parliamentary elec-
tions.71 Article 16 of Law No. 73 required that an Interior Ministry
appointee manage the Technical Secretariat.7 2 The appointment
of a political figure as head of the Technical Secretariat gave the
ruling NDP party considerable influence in selecting its political
62. See id.
63. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, supra note 58, at
26-27 (noting that the structure gave the NDP overriding control and led opposition
figures to question the independence and impartiality of the HEC).
64. TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 191 (2007).
65. Id. at 192-93. Meanwhile state security blockaded entire streets to prevent voters
from reaching the polls. Id. at 197.
66. Moustafa, supra note 50, at 921.
67. MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 193.
68. Id. at 194.
69. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 26.
70. Law No. 73 of 1956 (Concerning the Exercise of Political Rights), Alfarida Al-
Rasmiyya, art. 3(bis) (a) (Egypt).
71. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra
note 23, at 16.
72. Id. at 6.
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opponents for a given election and deterred it from objectively
investigating voting irregularities. Opposition parties, civil society
leaders, and political activists cited this undue influence as evi-
dence of the HEC's lack of independence.73
Under the pre-revolution version of Law No. 73 of 1956, the
Egyptian president had sole authority to appoint members of the
Technical Secretariat.74 Consequently, the HEC was politicized
and favored members of Mubarak's NDP in parliamentary elec-
tions.75 Before the revolution, the HEC's politicization allowed the
ruling NDP to staff the supervisory body with pro-NDP partisans,
limiting the potential avenues for opposition parties to seek redress
for demonstrated vote rigging, fraud, and voter intimidation.76
Moreover, the HEC's structure enabled the NDP to craft the rules
and electoral parameters of the elections by granting the NDP de
facto control of the HEC's power to promulgate electoral rules and
guidelines.77 Without independent oversight, elections were sub-
jected to improper interference by the dominant NDP at the
expense of other candidates. This dubious history led to demands
for post-revolution reform of the HEC membership selection
process.
B. Post-Revolution Amendments to Political Rights and the High
Elections Commission-Law No. 73 of 1956
The abrogation of the 1971 Constitution on February 13, 2011,
created a constitutional vacuum in Egypt,78 depriving elections of
constitutional legitimacy. A committee of jurists appointed by the
SCAF proposed a referendum to amend Article 88, which governs
the rules and procedures for parliamentary elections and candi-
73. Gamal Essam El-Din, Desperately Seeking the HEC, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Sept. 30,
2010), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/1017/eg6.htm.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. IN'T'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL Sys., ELECTIONS IN EGYr: ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PAR-
LIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM 3 (2011) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTORAL SYSTEM].
77. DEMOCRAcY REPORTING INT'L, THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, supra note 58, at 27.
78. Mariam Fam, Maram Mazen & Ahmed Namatalla, Egypt Constitution Suspended, Par-
liament Dissolved, Military Council Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-02-14/egyptian-military-says-protests-harming-the-economy-may-threaten-
security.html (explaining that the army suspended the constitution and would be meeting
demands made by the opposition movement that forced Mubarak from office, and addi-
tionally would rule Egypt until elections are held); see also Kochan, supra note 33, at 902
(asserting that power vacuums often follow nonviolent revolutions because the revolution
creates a void).
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date selection monitoring.79 Under the amended articles, an all-
judge HEC would administer and supervise elections and results
announcements.so The referendum culminated after a fervent
public debate about whether elections should occur before draft-
ing a new constitution."'
Advocates of a "no" vote wanted to draft a new constitution
instead of amending what they perceived as a highly flawed 1971
Constitution.82 The "no" voters sought to postpone parliamentary
and presidential elections until a new constitution was drafted via a
public and transparent process that incorporated the desires of
Egyptians seeking structural reforms.8 3 The "yes" voters wanted to
merely amend the 1971 Constitution to remove the NDP's grip on
power in order to give new political parties an opportunity to win
elections. 4 The "yes" voters were willing to hold off drafting a new
constitution until a new parliament and president were elected. 5
They believed this order of events would provide a more stable
transition from authoritarianism to democracy.86 With a record
high 41% voter turnout in the referendum, 77% of voters
approved the amendment of the 1971 Constitution and postpone-
ment of drafting a new constitution until after the parliamentary
79. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYrT art. 88, Sept. 11, 1971, as
amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007 ("The Law shall determine the condi-
tions which members of the Assembly must fulfill as well as the rules of election and refer-
endum, while the ballot shall be conducted under the supervision of the members of a
judiciary organ.").
80. See Noha El-Hennawy, Commission Announces Proposed Changes to Egyptian Constitu-
tion, EGYPT INDEP. (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/commission-
announces-proposed-changes-egyptian-constitution.
81. Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes, BBC (Mar. 20, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125; Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 190-92
(including a lengthy discussion of all the choices debated regarding when to hold elections
and when to draft a new constitution).
82. Yasmine El Rashidi, Egypt's First Vote, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 24, 2011), http://
www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/201 1/mar/24/egypts-first-vote/; Mallat et al., supra
note 1, at 190 (advocating complete redrafting of constitution before parliamentary
elections).
83. Rashidi, supra note 82; Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 191.
84. Demands to disqualify NDP candidates from parliamentary elections continued
into the winter of 2011. See, e.g., Tamer Mohamed, HEC Urged to Ban All Egypt NDP Affili-
ates, EGYPTIAN GAZETTE (Nov. 13, 2011) http://213.158.162.45/-egyptian/index.php?
action=news&id=22213&title=HECurgedtobarallEgyptNDPaffiliates (noting demands by
The Free Front for Peaceful Change, a political group formed after the revolution).
85. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 191 (emphasizing the minimization of time the mili-
tary was in control).
86. Id. at 191-92.
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elections.7 Twenty-three percent of voters opposed amending the
abrogated 1971 Constitution.88
In the March 2011 constitutional referendum, Egyptians voted
to amend Article 88, in addition to other articles, of the abrogated
1971 Constitution.89 The referendum reinstituted judicial supervi-
sion of elections, which was abolished in 2007,90 by amending the
following provision of Article 88,91 declaring in pertinent part:
A higher commission with full judicial composition shall supervise
elections and referenda and voter registration until the declara-
tion of the result, all of which shall be in accordance with the
regulations of the law. Balloting and counting shall be under-
taken under the supervision of members ofjudicial bodies nominated
by the supreme councils thereof whose selection shall be
decreed by the higher committee.92
Pursuant to this new constitutional provision, the SCAF issued
Decrees No. 46 and No. 110 of 2011 to amend thirty-two articles of
Law No. 73 of 1956, most of which concern the structure, member-
ship, and responsibilities of the HEC.9 3  Parliamentary appoint-
ments to the HEC are now prohibited.94  Instead, the HEC is
composed solely of senior judges,'9 5 including: (1) the president of
the Cairo Court of Appeals as chair; (2) the two most senior depu-
87. INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL Sys., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: LESSONS FROM THE 2011
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION 4 (2011), available at
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/201 1/-/media/Files/Publica-
tions/White%20PaperReport/2011/2011 egypt briefing-paperII.pdf.
88. Alex Kireev, Egypt. Constitutional Referendum 2011, ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY, http://
www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/e/egypt/egypt-constitutional-referen-
dum-201 I.html (last visitedJan. 8, 2013). As of the writing of this Article, Egypt has yet to
draft a new constitution.
89. The public referendum also concerned amendments to articles 75, 76, 77, 93,
139, and 149 and cancellation of 179. Gregg Carlstrom, Egypt's Proposed Constitutional
Amendments, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/
anger-in-egypt/2011/03/20113156309594476.html.
90. Gregg Carlstrom, Explainer: Inside Egypt's Recent Elections, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 15,
2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2011/11/2011111388371569
49.html.
91. Fact Sheet: Amendments to the Law on the Exercise of Political Rights, EGYPT STATE INFO.
SERV., http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/LastPage.aspx?CategoryID=1169 (last visited Jan. 8,
2013) (explaining the principal reforms include direct judicial composition and
supervision).
92. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 88, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended,
May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Mar. 30, 2011 (English translation) (emphasis
added).
93. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 4.
94. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra
note 23, at 2.
95. Id. at 3 (construing CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT arts. 166, 168,
11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007).
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ties of the president of the Court of Cassation; (3) the two most
senior deputies of the president of the State Council; and (4) the
two most senior presidents of the Court of Appeals after the presi-
dent of the Cairo Court of Appeals.9 6 The Supreme Councils of
the courts from which the HEC chair and members are drawn
select a reserve member for each position based on seniority.9 7
Moreover, HEC members cannot serve on other bodies that super-
vise elections or referenda.98
Although the amendments were well-received by Egyptians seek-
ing to strengthen the independence of the HEC, the HEC is not as
independent as it appears. Egypt's president appoints the senior
judges in the highest courts thereby granting him indirect control
over the judicial elections commissions.99 The president also influ-
ences senior judges through lucrative placements in Egyptian state
agencies and coveted consulting assignments abroad. 100 Similarly,
appointments to the election commissions are remunerated with a
sizeable bonus, further compromising the independence of the
judge who seeks to retain his appointment.101 Indeed, some senior
judges adjudicating cases where the state was a party were criticized
for perceived leniency in favor of the executive branch. 102 Hence,
an Egyptian judge interested in such opportunities is unlikely to
cross the executive branch in cases involving high profile political
disputes. 03 As discussed below in more detail in Part IV(C), ajudi-
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id.
99. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 30. The executive branch has power to
appoint the president of the SCC, president of the Court of Cassation, president of the
State Council, Public Prosecutor, High Court presidents, and deputies at the Ministry of
justice. Id. at 29.
100. Id. at 32-33. These temporary appointments ofjudges to governments abroad or
international organizations are known as "secondments." Id. They involve attractive com-
pensation packages as well as opportunities to live abroad in more developed countries.
See also MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 79 (highlighting the lucrative legal consulting positions
distributed to judges with critical positions in exchange for tacit compliance with govern-
ment interests in sensitive cases); ABDULLAH KHALIL ET AL., CAIRO INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
STUDIES, TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A VISION FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE
EGYPTIAN JUDICIARY 15 (2011) (recommending transferring the authority to transfer,
assign, or detail judges from the president to the High Judicial Council).
101. MoUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 193.
102. Id. at 193-94; see also Egyptian Policeman jailed over Activist Death, AL JAZEERA (Oct.
26, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/10/2011102614381282471.
html.
103. This was certainly the case in the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections. See
MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 193 (highlighting that judicial personnel participating in elec-
tion monitoring in the 2000 elections received a large bonus, causing reformers to suspect
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cially composed elections commission also entails risks to both the
electoral process and the independence of the judiciary.
1. Limited Reforms to the HEC's Membership
The permanent HEC Technical Secretariat, whose members
were previously appointed by the president of the republic, was
abolished by the post-revolution amendments. 10 4 In its place, the
HEC chair creates a permanent General Secretariat headed by one
of the deputies of the president of the Court of Cassation. 05 In
contrast to the pre-revolution model, the HEC-instead of the
president-now determines the composition and responsibilities
of the General Secretariat.10 6 The HEC delineates the Secretariat's
objectives and governing regulations. 07 Members of the General
Secretariat consist of an unspecified number of judges selected by
the High Judicial Council, in addition to representatives of the
Ministers of Interior, Communications and Information Technol-
ogy, and Local Development. 08 Notwithstanding the removal of
direct presidential control over the HEC, it remains to be seen
whether the appointed representatives of the executive agencies
will unduly politicize the HEC in favor of their respective political
parties.
The HEC membership selection process begins with the presi-
dents of the Court of Cassation, State Council, and Court of
Appeals nominating their two most senior deputies to the Minister
of Justice. 09 The Minister then recommends these individuals to
the president of the republic, who issues a decree naming them as
HEC members.110 This new structure anticipates deference by the
Minister of Justice and the president to the nominating judges'
selection of HEC members. Because approval by the Minister of
Justice and president is a mere formality, the new process transfers
control of the HEC from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, thereby depoliticizing oversight of parliamentary elections.
the bonus was used to assure cooperation with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
Justice).
104. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra
note 23, at 23.
105. Law No. 73 of 1956 (Concerning the Exercise of Political Rights), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiyya, art. 3(bis) (a) (Egypt).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra
note 23, at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Consistent with its responsibility to supervise parliamentary elec-
tions and national referenda, the HEC forms a committee in each
governorate to regulate elections, 1 ' implement elections monitor-
ing, and receive reports and grievances relating to the electoral
process."'1 Each committee, chaired by the president of the Courts
of Appeals, includes (1) a State Council justice;" 3 (2) the presi-
dent of the Court of First Instance;" 4 (3) a deputy president of the
Administrative Lawsuits Authority;" 5 and (4) a deputy president of
the Administrative Prosecution.116 These significant changes to
the composition of the HEC further contribute to the depoliticiza-
tion of the election process by shifting election oversight from the
executive branch to the judicial branch." 7 However, as previously
noted, the current executive appointment of seniorjudges coupled
with the hierarchical structure of the judiciary still grants the exec-
utive branch significant control over the elections commissions,
albeit indirectly.
So long as the Egyptian judiciary maintains its independence,s
which is arguably at risk if the executive branch can unilaterally
111. Law No. 73 of 1956 (Concerning the Exercise of Political Rights), Al-jarida Al-
Rasmiyya, arts. 23-26 (Egypt).
112. Id. art. 3(bis) (e), (f).
113. Also known as the Administrative Courts, the State Council presides over any
administrative disputes in which any administrative body is a party. Wahab, supra note 8,
§ 6.10. The State Council has its own judicial structure and hierarchy, where the Supreme
Administrative Court sits at the apex of that structure. Id.
114. The Courts of First Instance are the trial courts in Egypt. Id. § 6. The Courts'
jurisdiction includes presiding over civil suits brought before them by private parties. Id.
§ 7.
115. The Egyptian State Lawsuits Authority is an Egyptian judicial institution that was
established in 1874, nine years before the Egyptian national courts were established in
1883. Id. § 6.8. Despite being recognized as ajudicial institution, the Authority does not
perform any actual judicial function. Id. Instead, the Authority's role is confined to repre-
senting the State before national and international courts and arbitral tribunals. Id. It has
the legal authority to plead on behalf of the State. Id.
116. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra
note 23, at 4.
117. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 187.
118. Dina Zayed, Analysis: Egypt's Judges Shoulder Hopes for Democracy, REUTERS (Nov. 2,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/02/us-egypt-judiciary-idUSTRE7AI3XR2
0111102. Zayed described the Egyptian judiciary as follows:
One of the first Arab states to establish a judiciary, Egypt has a legacy of judicial
independence that endured even after a 1952 coup ushered in successive military
rulers. For decades, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) and other courts
provided avenues for opposition parties, rights groups and activists to meaning-
fully challenge authorities.
Id. For an in-depth analysis of Egypt's judicial system, see generally NATHAN J. BROWN, THE
RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997). See also Mous-
TAFA, supra note 64, at 91-104 (summarizing the SCC's refusal to succumb to co-optation
by the executive branch).
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appoint senior judges to the highest courts,119 these reforms are an
improvement. That said, the judiciary's direct supervision of elec-
tions and arbitration of election disputes in the first instance
exposes it to undue politicization. Political parties will inevitably
challenge unfavorable HEC and PEC rulings on political disputes
and directly challenge the legitimacy of the judiciary. Indeed, this
occurred in April 2012 when the judges on the PEC disqualified
ten presidential candidates.12 0 Opponents of the ruling ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the PEC.121 Placing judges in the direct
line of fire in political disputes ultimately compromises the judici-
ary's independence, leading to much larger governance problems.
Additionally, the executive branch may pressure judges, as it did
prior to 2007 when the political-appointee-run elections commis-
sion was created, to legitimize sham election results.122 Therefore,
the HEC and PEC should be transformed into independent (non-
judicial) elections commissions whose decisions are subject tojudi-
cial review, thereby preserving the legitimacy and independence of
the judiciary.
2. Expansion of the HEC's Mandate
In addition to changing the composition of the HEC, SCAF
Decrees 46 and 110 of 2011 expand the HEC's scope of author-
ity.123 Before the January 25 Revolution, the HEC's mandate was
limited to recommending rules for election regulation and guide-
lines for the electoral process.'24 Critics often highlighted that the
pre-revolution HEC had little authority to resolve election irregu-
larities.125 For example, a ruling in 2010 by the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court, Egypt's highest court for settling disputes between
119. To offset the staunchly independent members of the judiciary, Mubarak
appointed a number of judges loyal to the NDP and President Mubarak. Nathan Brown,
Egypt'sJudges in a Revolutionaiy Age, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Feb. 2012),
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/22/egypt%E2%80%99s-judges-
in-a-revolutionary-age.
120. Rana Khazbak, Election Commission's Disqualifications Dubious, Say Experts, EGYPT
INDEP. (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/elections-commissions-
disqualifications-dubious-say-experts.
121. Id.
122. Brown, supra note 119.
123. Decree Law No. 46 (Concerning Amendments to Law No. 73 of 1956) (Egypt);
Decree Law No. 1110 (Concerning Amendments to Law No. 73 of 1956) (Egypt).
124. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, supra
note 23, at 4-5.
125. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, supra note 58, at 27.
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citizens and state bodies, 126 invalidated parliamentary election
results following widespread voting fraud and voter intimidation.12 7
In its ruling, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the HEC
failed to safeguard election sites and investigate voting irregulari-
ties.128 Furthermore, the Supreme Administrative Court held that
the HEC's selection of judges to supervise more than 200 general
polling stations violated the Judicial Authority Law,129 which
granted the authority to the General Assembly of the Courts. 3 0 In
invalidating the election results, the Court strongly condemned the
HEC's lack of independence from the Interior Ministry and the
HEC's systematic disregard for the law, the constitution, and previ-
ous court rulings. 31 Such outcomes were inevitable given that the
HEC's politicized membership was composed of NDP operatives
tasked with ensuring the NDP retained its dominance in both
houses of parliament. 13 2
Post-revolution, the HEC was granted new powers to investigate
complaints of electoral irregularities. Declaration No. 120 of 2011
amended articles 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50 of the Law on
the Exercise of Political Rights to impose punitive measures for
engaging in violence, bribery, and religious sloganeering in elec-
tions.133 The HEC is also responsible for ensuring a level playing
field among political parties to avoid repeating past favoritism
towards the majority party. 134 Notably, the HEC is now responsible
for managing Egyptian and international election observers' 35-a
positive indication that Egypt recognizes that independent observ-
ers facilitate free and fair elections. The HEC, however, limited
126. The Supreme Administrative Court has jurisdiction over appeals in administrative
disputes in which any administrative body is a party in a matter. Wahab, supra note 8,
§ 6.10. Administrative courts have jurisdiction over the settlement of administrative or
public law matters governed by the jus imperii. Id. § 7.
127. Elections Held in 2010, INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, http://www.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2097_10.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
128. See id.
129. Law No. 142 of 2006 (Concerning the Judicial Authority).
130. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, supra note 58, at 27.
131. See Elections Held in 2010, supra note 127.
132. See supra Part III.A.
133. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, EGYPTIAN AM. RULE OF LAW Ass'N, CHRONICLES OF THE EGYP-
TIAN REVOLUTION OF 25 JANUARY 2011: LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 17, 24-28
(2012), available at http://www.earla.org/userfiles/Egypt%2OUpdate%20%20Thirteenth
%20(13%20-%20Cherif%20Bassiouni).pdf.
134. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, THE ROAD To ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: ELECTORAL
REFORMS SINCE FEBRUARY 2011, at 3 (2011) (stating that legislative amendments requiring
judges compose the HEC will improve public confidence in the electoral process because
of historical public trust in the independence of the judiciary).
135. Id. at 3-4.
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the role of international monitors and media to participating in
"following" the elections as opposed to "observing" the elections,13 6
invoking Egypt's sovereignty to justify their decision.1 3 7
Additional new post-revolution powers include the ability to: (1)
appoint members and secretaries of the general election, polling,
and counting committees; (2) supervise the preparation, content,
method of review, editing and updating, registration, and correc-
tion of voter lists from the National ID database; (3) promulgate
rules for regulating electoral campaigning, including "equal-time"
rules for TV and radio advertising; (4) develop a system of electoral
symbols for political parties and independent candidates; and (5)
declare the results of elections and referenda and determine the
time for run-off elections.38 Whether the HEC effectively enforces
its broader mandate is yet to be determined and is beyond the
scope of this Article. 39
However, the HEC also lost powers. The HEC can no longer:
(1) propose constituency-defining rules; (2) contribute to raising
awareness of elections and developing rules to guide that process;
or (3) monitor adherence to an election code of ethics.140 Political
analysts predict these changes will impair the political process
because no other governmental entity is tasked with educating vot-
ers about the electoral process.14 1 These changes, coupled with
voter fatigue arising from the complicated voting process, are likely
to adversely impact voter turnout in future elections.14 2
Meanwhile, many ambiguities in the electoral laws remain
unresolved. For instance, while the amended version of Law No.
38 of 1972 envisions the formation of political coalitions, it does
not provide any details on how coalitions may register.143 Without
a clear and accessible coalition-forming process, smaller parties are
disadvantaged because they rely on coalitions to pool their
136. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 18.
137. Id.
138. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, Supra
note 23, at 13.
139. But see Ernesto Londono & Ingy Hassieb, Allegations of Fraud Cloud Egypt Runoff
WASH. POST, May 27, 2012, at Al7 (documenting allegations of violation of election finance
laws by Shafiq).
140. STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HIGHER ELECTIONS COMMISSION, Supra
note 23, at 5.
141. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, EGYPT'S ELECTIONS: GREATER TRANSPARENCY TO
STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE 2 (2011) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, GREATER
TRANSPARENCY].
142. Id.
143. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-arida Al-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972 (Egypt).
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resources to compete against the larger parties for seats in the par-
liament.' 4 4 Law No. 38 of 1972 also fails to specify how to dis-
tribute votes garnered by a coalition among its various political
parties.14 5 These details are necessary to determine which specific
parties meet the minimum number of votes needed for a parlia-
mentary seat. Without clear rules governing coalitions, political
disputes among coalition members seeking a seat in the parliament
are inevitable. As a result, Law No. 38 deters formations of coali-
tions, thus disfavoring smaller parties. 146
Despite the shortcomings of post-revolution amendments to Law
No. 73 of 1956, they signify a positive development towards democ-
racy. By removing control over election monitoring from the exec-
utive branch and placing it squarely under the purview of the
judiciary, the post-revolution amendments shift Egypt's electoral
framework towards a more transparent and independent process-
so long as the judiciary is independent.147 The HEC's expanded
authority increases the likelihood that election irregularities will be
adequately and promptly redressed. While it is too soon to con-
clude whether these reforms are sufficient to establish a sustainable
democracy in Egypt, they are certainly a positive step in the right
direction.
C. The People's Assembly before the Revolution-Law No. 38 of 1972
The overthrow of the British-backed monarchy in 1952 by Egyp-
tian military officers ushered in a series of political reforms that
came to be known as "pan-Arab socialism."1 4 8 Introduced by Presi-
dent Gamal Abdel-Nasser, pan-Arab socialism sought to politically
enfranchise peasants and rural farmers-two lower classes long
144. See Decree Law No. 108 of 2011 (Concerning Amendments to Law No. 38), art.
XV (Egypt).
145. See id.
146. A Look at the Major Alliances for Egypt's Parliamentary Elections, VOICE Ami. (Nov. 27,
2011), http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2011/11/27/a-look-at-major-alliances-
for-egypts-parliamentary-elections. In the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, political par-
ties formed four major coalitions: (1) The Democratic Alliance for Egypt; (2) Islamist Alli-
ance; (3) Egyptian Bloc; (4) Completing the Revolution Alliance. BASSIOUNI, supra note
133, at 24-28.
147. See Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 187 (identifying the judiciary as the only group
with the necessary expertise and detachment from executive and legislative positions to
supervise); Brown, supra note 119 (noting that Sadat and Mubarak undid Nasser's policies
that compromised judicial independence by granting leading judicial bodies-the admin-
istrative court systems, for instance, as well as the regular court system-considerable
autonomy in their own affairs).
148. See TAKESHI HAYASHI, THE DEVELOPINc ECONOMIEs 88 (1964).
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neglected under the monarchy. 4 9 Following the dissolution of
Egypt's political union with Syria in 1961, a new provisional consti-
tution was created in 1964, establishing an elected 350-member
unicameral parliament known as the National Assembly.15 0  To
enfranchise peasants and farmers, the provisional 1964 Constitu-
tion required that "workers" and "farmers" make up at least one-
half of the National Assembly and delegated to the president the
power to appoint ten members.' 5 ' Both practices were incorpo-
rated into the permanent 1971 Constitution and the election pro-
cess for the People's Assembly-the successor to the National
Assembly. 152
Law No. 38 of 1972 established a 454-member People's Assem-
bly.15 3 It allocated ten seats for presidential appointment with the
remaining 444 members elected through a two-round system.15 4
The 444 elected members consisted of two candidates elected from
each of Egypt's 222 electoral districts by a simple majority vote.15 5
Additionally, pursuant to Article 87, at least one winning candidate
in each district had to be a "worker" or a "farmer."15 6 Thus, Law
No. 38 of 1972 required that ballots identify candidates as
149. Id.
150. Moustafa, supra note 50, at 889.
151. See id.
152. Brown & Stilt, supra note 28, at 3.
153. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972 (Egypt).
154. Id. art. 2. Law No. 38 of 1972 does not explicitly define "professionals." See id.
This term, however, likely refers to individuals working in an occupation with a profes-
sional syndicate. See Donald M. Reid, The Rise of Professions and Professional Organizations in
Modern Egypt, 16 COMP. STUD. Soc'y & HIsT. 24, 24, 28, 48 (1974) (noting occupations with
a professional syndicate include doctors, lawyers, engineers, pharmacists, teachers, and
journalists).
155. Law No. 206 of 1990 (Concerning Political Constituencies of the People's Assem-
bly and Shura Council), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya (Egypt). For a detailed discussion of the
history of Egypt's elections and attempts to adopt the proportional representation system,
see MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 96-103.
156. Article 2 of Law No. 38 of 1972 defines "farmer" as a "person whose sole work and
main source of living is cultivation, and resides in the countryside, providing he, his wife
and minor children shall not own or lease more than ten feddans [acres]." Law No. 38 of
1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), AlJarida Al-Rasmiyya, 28 Sept. 1972, art. 2
(Egypt). Moreover, it defines "worker" as a "person who depends mainly on his income
from manual or mental work in agriculture, industry or services . . . [who is] not . . . a
member of a professional syndicate, or recorded in the commercial register, or a holder of
a high academic qualification." Id.
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"worker/farmer"1 5 7 or "professional."158 Under this system, a can-
didate won a seat by obtaining a simple majority of all valid votes
cast in the two-member district in the first round.'5 9 The occupa-
tional requirements under Article 87 of the 1971 Constitution,
however, significantly complicated the means for casting votes and
the process of determining the winning candidates. 60
The following hypotheticals illustrate the byzantine nature of the
system: (1) if only one candidate obtained a simple majority, and
he or she was a professional, then the top two worker/farmer can-
didates competed in a second round; (2) if only one candidate
obtained a simple majority, and he or she was a worker/farmer,
then the next two candidates with the highest number of votes
(regardless of category) competed in the second round; (3) if two
candidates were elected in the first round and both were profes-
sionals, then only the candidate with the highest vote total was
elected, and the top two worker/farmer candidates competed in a
second round; and (4) if no candidate obtained a simple majority,
a second round would be held consisting of four candidates, with
two worker/farmer candidates. At least one seat had to be awarded
to the top worker/farmer candidate.16 1 Predictably, these convo-
luted rules created a fertile environment for election fraud where
candidates mischaracterized themselves as farmers or workers to
increase their chances of securing a parliamentary seat.' 62
Through the 1980s, Egypt used a proportional representation
system for both national and local elections.1 6 3 Only members of
officially recognized political parties could participate in elections
157. Law No. 38 of 1972 requires "workers" to submit a certificate from the employer,
certified by the Office of Social Insurance, listing the candidate's benefit of employment,
remuneration, and qualifications; a certificate from the union to which they belong; and
proof that he/she began working there before they acquired a university degree. See id.
The certificate must also indicate whether the employee is still registered in the particular
union. Id.
158. Law No. 38 of 1972 requires "farmers" to submit official documentation for the
acquisition of agricultural land held by the candidate, his wife, and minor children,
whatever the type of property owned or rented, with a maximum of ten feddans (acres).
Id. Farmers must also submit a certificate stating that agriculture is the main source of
livelihood and that he/she resides in the village or rural area. Id.
159. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
160. See id. at 3, 9 (explaining the process and consequences of the occupational
requirements); see also Kochan, supra note 33, at 908 (noting that post-revolution elections
take time).
161. See ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
162. Jano Charbel, Eye on Elections: Does the Workers and Farmers Quota Help Workers and
Farmers?, EGYPT INDEP. (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/520 8 7 6.
163. MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 96.
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through party listS.164 Parties had to obtain at least 8% of the votes
cast nationally to win a parliamentary seat-a high threshold that
most opposition parties could not meet.165 When parties fell short
of this threshold, their votes were transferred to the party that won
a plurality of the seats. 166 Law No. 40 of 1977 granted the Political
Parties Affairs Committee the authority to adjudicate a political
party's application for official party recognition.1 6 7 The NDP, as
ruling party, manipulated this process by appointing pro-NDP
members to the Committee, which in turn recognized political par-
ties that posed little threat to the NDP's grip on power.168 Alto-
gether, these factors enabled the NDP to thwart serious political
challengers.69
In 1987, the SCC struck down the proportional representation
list system as unconstitutional.170 The Court held that the system
infringed on citizens' constitutional right to participate in public
life because it denied them the opportunity to run for office unless
they joined an official political party.171 Following the Court's rul-
ing, the People's Assembly dissolved, new electoral laws were
drafted, and new elections were held in 1987.172
The 1987 amendments to Law No. 38 of 1972 minimally com-
plied with the SCC's ruling. 73 The amendments divided the coun-
try into twenty-four multiple-member districts for proportional
distribution among party lists and reserved two seats per district for
independent candidates.174 The amendments, however, main-
tained the 8% minimum threshold that was required for gaining a
parliamentary seat and gerrymandered electoral districts in a man-
ner that significantly disadvantaged opposition parties.17 5  For
164. Id.
165. Id. Notably, post-revolution amendments decreased this threshold to 5% of the
votes cast nationally, making it easier for minority parties to field candidates. See id. at
210-11.
166. Id. at 96.
167. Law No. 40 of 1977 (Concerning the Political Parties System), AlfJarida Al-Rasmiyya
art. 8 (Egypt).
168. See MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 94.
169. See id. at 93-97 (noting how the populace felt there was a lack of competition in
the political process).
170. Id. at 97.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 97-98.
175. Id. at 98. Egypt has a history of gerrymandering by the dominant party to weaken
opposition candidates. Id. at 190 (describing the blatant gerrymandering that occurred in
the lead up to the 1999 presidential elections and 2000 parliamentary elections).
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example, the amendments allocated thirteen People's Assembly
seats to a district with five million residents while allocating sixteen
seats to another district with only two million residents.17 6 Other
districts with as few as 350,000 residents received as many as five
seats.'77
The SCC struck down these amendments in 1990.178 As a result,
Egypt abandoned the proportional representation system alto-
gether and adopted a winner-take-all system for elections to the
People's Assembly.179 Each of the country's 222 districts was allo-
cated two seats.1 s0 Farmers and workers had to win at least one seat
per district, as required under Article 87 of the 1971 Constitu-
tion.18 ' Opposition parties initially welcomed these changes and
pushed for further electoral reforms.8 2 Instead, the Mubarak
regime issued Law No. 206 of 1990 that gerrymandered district
boundaries to the advantage of the then-ruling NDP.a 3
In November 2010, the Mubarak regime amended Law No. 38 of
1972 to increase the number of seats in the People's Assembly to
518 in order to accommodate a new sixty-four-seat quota for
female candidates.18 4 Six months prior, in February 2010, the UN
criticized Egypt for its dismally low female representation in gov-
ernment.185 As discussed in more detail below in Part IV(A) (1),
the Mubarak regime consequently adopted and touted a gender
quota as a mechanism for politically empowering women.' 86 In
practice, however, the quota was merely an additional means by
which to install more Mubarak loyalists (albeit women) into the
parliament.1 8 7 Under the 2010 amendments, the Egyptian presi-
dent retained the right to appoint ten seats with the remaining 508
seats elected through the two-member district system discussed
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 99.
179. Id. at 100.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Adam Morrow, Egypt: Disputes Rise over Quotas for Women MPs, INTER PRESS SERV.
(July 27, 2009), http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/07/egypt-disputes-rise-over-quotas-for-
women-mps.
185. Concluding Observations, supra note 39.
186. See infra Part IV.A.
187. AMNESTY INT'L, WOMEN DEMAND EQUALTY IN SHAPING NEW EGYPr 7 (2011) (noting
that all of the seats reserved for women under the quota system went to members of the
ruling NDP party).
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above.188 Although not required by law, President Mubarak tradi-
tionally reserved seven of the ten presidentially appointed seats for
Coptics.' 89 In the end, Egyptians viewed the 2010 parliamentary
elections as the most fraudulent under Mubarak's rule, which ulti-
mately led to his demise. 190
D. Changes to the People's Assembly after the Revolution-Law No. 38
of 1972
On September 25, 2011, the SCAF issued Decree No. 108 of
2011, which amended Law No. 38 of 1972 to reduce the People's
Assembly from 518 to 508 seats.' 9 ' The amendments authorize the
SCAF to appoint up to ten seats; and of the remaining 498 seats,
two-thirds (332 seats) are elected through proportional party rep-
resentation and one-third (166 seats) through an independent can-
didate system.192 To the detriment of female representation,
Decree No. 108 abolishes the pre-revolution 64-seat quota for
female candidates.193 The following Sections highlight Decree No.
108's failure to promote female and minority representation in
Egypt's parliament and the continuation of the worker/farmer
quota, which increases the risk of election fraud.
As discussed in further detail below, 94 five months after Egypt's
first post-revolution 2011 parliamentary elections, the SCC struck
down portions of the election law as unconstitutional and ordered
a dissolution of the People's Assembly.195 This has only exacer-
bated political uncertainties and further deepened the divide
between the Muslim Brotherhood, who dominated the People's
Assembly, and the SCAF.
188. Elections Held in 2010, supra note 127.
189. See ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 1.
In the 2011 People's Assembly elections, the SCAF followed this precedent by appointing
five Coptics. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L
PEACE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/25/
results-of-egypt%E2%80%99s-people%E2%80%99s-assembly-elections.
190. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 15.
191. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), AljaridaAl-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972 (Egypt). Despite the remaining flaws in Egypt's post-revolution electoral sys-
tem, an unprecedented 70% of the electorate participated in the 2011-2012 parliamentary
elections. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 6.
192. BAsSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 16.
193. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2.
194. See infra Part III.D.3.
195. Case no. 20/34/Constitutional Court (Egypt), available at http://www.earla.org/
news-eventsdetail.php?id=79 (unofficial English translation).
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1. The Proportional Party Representation System
In theory, proportional systems favor party agendas over a candi-
date's charisma, wealth, or personal political connections. Presum-
ably, political parties will select the candidates most likely to
succeed and be reelected in the next election. In contrast, an inde-
pendent candidate system tends to favor wealthy individuals who
may not be qualified to hold political office but are able to self-
finance a political campaign. Because Egypt is in dire need of fea-
sible solutions that address the intractable combination of rapid
increases in poverty, overpopulation, a contracting industrial sec-
tor, and a dysfunctional education system,1 9 6 a proportional repre-
sentation system may produce a more competent parliament.
However, the proportional system excludes independent political
activists operating outside the constraints of an arrangement where
the dominant party retains control of government. 19 7
Under the proportional party representation system, Law No. 38
of 1972 divides Egypt into forty-six proportional representation dis-
tricts with the "average size of the People's Assembly multi-member
districts is 7.2 seats per district, while the two-member majoritarian
districts are much larger in size." 198 Within each district, the per-
centage of the total number of votes received by a given party
determines the proportional number of seats allocated to that
party.' 99 For example, if a party receives 25% of the votes in a four-
seat district, that party is allocated one of the district's four seats.
196. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, REG'L BUREAU FOR ARAB STATES, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 2009: CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES (2009).
Egypt's unemployment rate rose from 7.6% in the 1980s to 9.6% in the 1990s, and it is
estimated that from 1980 through 2002, the Egyptian unemployment rate grew 2.2%. Id.
at 108-09. Based on the upper national poverty line of $2.70 per day, 40.93% of Egypt's
total population and 52% of its rural population is living in poverty. Id. at 114. The urban
growth rate as of 2005 was close to a 2% annual increase, and from 2000 through 2005
Egypt had population growth close to 2%. Id. at 35-36. The current state of Egypt's indus-
trial development is significantly weaker compared to the 1960s and 70s. Id. at 103-05.
National data from the region is heavily skewed due to the oil producing nations, of which
Egypt is not a participant. Id. at 103. Egypt's informal, non-industrialized section makes
up 40-50% of the country's economy. Id. at 11; see also The Role of Education in the Arab
World Revolutions, BROOKINGS INST. Uune 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2011/06/10-arab-world-education-winthrop ("These revolutions [in the Arab
world] were not propagated by well-educated youth, . . . [but] by the needs and demands
of poorly educated youth, whose knowledge and skills do not meet the rising demands of a
rapidly-advancing world.").
197. MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 96.
198. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
199. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972, art. 15 (Egypt).
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The proportional system vests significant discretion in party lead-
ership who determine the order of candidates on party lists.20 0
Each party creates and publishes a candidate list for each district,
with the number of listed candidates equal to the total number of
seats in that district. 201 Should a party win in a particular district,
those candidates listed higher on the list receive priority placement
over those listed below. 2 0 2 For example, in a candidate list num-
bered one through six, the candidate listed third is given a seat
only after the first and second candidate on the list are seated and
before any candidates listed fourth, fifth, or sixth. Therefore, a
candidate's positioning on the list determines his or her chances of
attaining a seat. After determining its allocated number of seats
based on the percentage of votes received, a party fills those seats
according to its candidate list.203 Notably, most female candidates
in the 2011 elections appeared at the bottom of each party's closed
candidate list,204 resulting in only twelve women elected to the Peo-
ple's Assembly and five to the Shura Council. 205 This is a signifi-
cant reduction compared to the sixty-four women in the People's
Assembly206 and eleven women in the Shura Council before the
revolution. 207
2. The Independent Candidate System
Under the independent candidate system, Law No. 38 of 1972
now divides Egypt into eighty-three districts with one seat contested
by professionals and one seat contested by a farmer or worker in
each district.208 Pursuant to a winner-take-all process, the candi-
date who obtains a majority of all valid votes wins a seat to the
People's Assembly.209 Historically, independent candidate slots
200. MousTAFA, supra note 64, at 96.
201. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), AlJarda Al-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972, art. 15 (Egypt).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Reem Leila, On Their Own, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Nov. 24-30, 2011), http://weekly.
ahram.org.eg/2011/1073/foll2.htm (listing the parties that placed female candidates at
or near the bottom of their party list in the People's Assembly elections).
205. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, supra note 189; Press Release, Carter Ctr.,
Preliminary Statement on Egypt's Shura Council Election (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.
cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-022812.html [hereinafter Press Release, Carter Ctr., Pre-
liminary Statement].
206. Elections Held in 2010, supra note 127.
207. 44 Shura Appointments Include 8 Copts, EGYPT INDEP. (June 22, 2010), http://www.
egyptindependent.com/node/51103.
208. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLLAMENTARY ELECrORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
209. Id. (noting that majority vote is met by obtaining at least 50% plus one of votes).
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offered the only avenue for banned parties, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, to seek political representation in government.210
Hence, parties like the Muslim Brotherhood depended largely on a
candidate-centered system for fielding independent candidates in
parliamentary elections.211 In the post-revolution context, candi-
dates with liberal or progressive leanings are likely to benefit from
the independent candidate system because either the liberal par-
ties are unable to compete with the Muslim Brotherhood's formi-
dable party infrastructure or the candidate cannot find a political
party with a similar political agenda. 212
Meanwhile, the pre-revolution occupational requirement still
applies as at least half of the seats in the People's Assembly remain
allocated to "farmers" and "workers."213 Under the proportional
representation system, workers and farmers need not appear at the
top of each party's candidate list; worker/farmer candidates, how-
ever, may not appear consecutively on a given list.214 Such favorit-
ism towards farmers and workers incentivizes ambitious candidates
to mischaracterize themselves to increase their chances of winning
a parliamentary seat.215 As described in Part III(C) above, for seats
contested through this form of independent candidate system each
electoral district must seat at least one worker or farmer, complicat-
ing how votes are cast and winners are selected. 216
The most significant post-revolution amendment to Law No. 38
governing the People's Assembly elections is the removal of the
sixty-four-seat quota for female candidates, which effectively shuts
out women from the lower house of parliament.217 Without the
quota, only a handful of women will be elected to office-as exem-
210. Hany Besada, Egypt's Constitutional Test Averting the March Toward Islamic Fundamen-
talism 3 (Ctr. for Int'l Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 28, 2007), available at
http://cigionline.cigiprojects.org/publications/2007/8/egypts-constitutional-test-averting-
march-toward-islamic-fundamentalism.
211. Id.; MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 197 (describing the Muslim Brotherhood's his-
toric win of seventeen independent seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections, which was
more than all candidates standing for election from the formal opposition parties
combined).
212. Amr Hamzawy, for example, was a candidate of the Egypt Freedom Party. Amr
Hamzawy, AHRAM ONLINE (Nov. 19, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/
102/2671 1/Elections-/Whos-who/Amr-Hamzawy.aspx.
213. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Aljarida Al-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972, art. I (Egypt).
214. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
215. Charbel, supra note 162 (highlighting the fraudulent use of broad union recogni-
tion to allow business people to run as "workers"; the very small amount of land needed to
qualify as a "farmer"; and the abuse of these lax standards by business people and officers).
216. See ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
217. See Leila, supra note 204.
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plified in the 2011 elections where only nine women were elected
to the People's Assembly. 218 It is worth acknowledging the paradox
created by quotas. On the one hand, purely democratic elections
are not constrained by quotas that advantage a particular group
over another. On the other hand, it is a fallacy that all citizens
have equal opportunity to run for political office.219 Disparities in
income and social status coupled with cultural bias against particu-
lar groups impede equal opportunity, thereby warranting affirma-
tive measures that remedy entrenched disadvantages. 2 2 0 Thus, a
purely democratic system adopted after years of authoritarian rule
merely reinforces inequities that are the byproducts of
authoritarianism.
In the 2011 parliamentary elections, women performed poorly
under the proportional representation system because parties,
required by law to include them, consistently placed women candi-
dates at the bottom of their lists.221 Furthermore, few women have
the economic resources and political clout to be elected under the
independent candidate system by voters who are disinclined to vote
women into political office.2 22 Such distorted outcomes under-
mine the legitimacy of the government as Egyptian women ques-
tion the parliament's ability to adequately represent their interests
in a country where women's rights have historically been
marginalized.
218. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, supra note 189 (documenting that nine
women were elected to the People's Assembly and that SCAF appointed three).
219. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 10-11
(noting that Egypt's electoral laws deny certain societal groups representation (e.g., Cop-
tics and women)).
220. See DRUDE DAHLERUP & LENITA FREIDENVALL, DIRECTORATE GEN. INTERNAL POLICIES
OF THE UNION, ELECTORAL GENDER QUOTA SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION IN EUROPE
19, 48 (2008).
221. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 10
(explaining that women placed second or third on a party's candidate list have a far less
chance of winning than those listed first or simply higher).
222. See NAZRA FOR FEMINIST STUDIEs, SHE AND ELECTIONS: MENTORING ON THE GROUND
WITH THE CANDIDATES 2011/2012, at 3, 5, 11, 15 (2012); AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 187, at I
(noting that "misguided views about women's ability or right to be involved in politics are
also prevalent, especially in rural areas"). Such outcomes are precisely why the quotas were
instituted. HALA MUSTAFA ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE,
BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT: WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, POLITICAL PARTY LIFE
AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 14 (2005), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/
demegypt/upload/EgyptcountryreportEnglish.pdf.
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3. Creation of a Mixed Electoral System for Parliamentary
Elections
As the prior two Sections illustrate, the SCAF's Decree 108 of
2011 created a mixed electoral system for both houses of parlia-
ment comprised of winner-take-all independent candidates and
proportional party representation districts. Decree No. 108 was a
compromise law promulgated after a highly contentious debate
between the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, the
SCAF, liberal parties, and civil society organizations.2 2 3 In May
2011, the SCAF proposed a draft parliamentary election law that
preserved the winner-take-all-district system and the occupational
requirements applicable to two-thirds of the People's Assembly. 224
Candidates would contest the remaining one-third of the seats
through a proportional representation system.225 In response to
political parties' concerns that the former regime misused gender
quotas to select female NDP supporters, rather than as a mecha-
nism to empower women in politics, Decree 108 of 2011 abolished
the sixty-four-seat quota reserved for female candidates.226
With regard to the proportional representation system, political
parties and the SCAF were unable to agree on the minimum num-
ber of votes required for a party to obtain a parliamentary seat.2 2 7
The initial draft law failed to address many important facets of the
electoral process, including the size of parliament, the allocation of
seats to each governorate, the formula for allocating proportional
representation seats, and the issue of Egyptian expatriates voting
abroad.228 Thus, most political parties rejected the May 2011 draft
law. 229
In July 2011, the SCAF proposed a second draft election law that
set the People's Assembly at 504 members and the Shura Council
at 390 members, of which 260 would be elected and 130
appointed.230 Under this draft, 50% of all parliamentary seats
223. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELEcTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2-3.
224. See id. at 2.
225. See id.
226. What Does Egypt's Parliament Look Like?, BBC (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/magazine-16701937. With the dissolution of the NDP, concern over abuse of the
quota became moot and served only to penalize women by excluding them from elected
office. See id. (noting that women only hold around 1 percent of the seats in the new
assembly). Moreover, alternative means exist to address quota abuse concerns without
penalizing women for the NDP's corruption.
227. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
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would be elected through the proportional representation system
and the other 50% through the independent candidate district sys-
tem .23  To facilitate this dual system, the law created fifty-eight
proportional representation districts for the People's Assembly and
twenty-eight Shura Council proportional representation dis-
tricts. 2 3 2 The July 2011 draft maintained the occupational require-
ment, and, while it also abolished the quota for women, it required
that each party include at least one woman anywhere on their party
lists in proportional representation districts.233
Political parties and civil society organizations opposed the July
2011 draft election law out of concern that prominent ex-NDP
members would take advantage of the independent candidate sys-
tem applicable to half the seats of parliament, resulting in the
reemergence of the NDP in parliament.23 4 Instead, political par-
ties demanded a "closed-list"235 proportional representation system
where voters choose a candidate from a party's fixed list of candi-
dates, rather than an individual candidate.2 36 The parties argued
that this system simultaneously weakens the significance of individ-
ual candidates, including former NDP members, and empowers
political parties to control which candidates run in parliamentary
elections. 23 7
This concern has particular salience in Egypt because voters his-
torically select candidates based on familial allegiances, instruc-
tions by village elders, or the candidates' political connections. 238
Deeply entrenched cronyism has produced little by way of eco-
nomic and social development for constituents.239 To the contrary,
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 3.
235. A closed list is one in which the order of the candidates on the list is fixed at the
time of registration. See id. at 6.
236. News Wires, Egyptian Military Amends Controversial Election Law, FR. 24 (Oct. 9,
2011), http://www.france24.com/en/20111008-egypt-military-election-law-president-legis-
lative-candidates.
237. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3; see
also Charles Levinson, Surprise Rise of Mubarak Loyalist, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2012), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303674004577434562867892748.html (report-
ing that Coptic "vote for Shafiq was spread by word of mouth, in churches"); Richard
Spencer, Egypt Decides Between Army and Mosque, TELEGRAPH (May 22, 2012), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9283646/Egypt-decides-
between-army-and-mosque.html (reporting the observation of an imam in a small town
giving a public sermon implying who the congregation should vote for).
238. LISA BLAYDES, ELECTIONS AND DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS IN MUBARAK'S EcvPr 107
(2011).
239. Id. at 108.
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elected officials typically use their positions to engage in self-deal-
ing and personal enrichment. 2 4 0 Hence, requiring voters to select
political parties, instead of individuals, presumably shifts political
power to those with developed political agendas.2 4 1
In September 2011, the SCAF introduced a third draft election
law following its official announcement that parliamentary elec-
tions would begin in November 2011.242 Partially accepting the
political parties' demands, the amendments allocated a third of the
seats through the independent candidate winner-take-all system
and the remaining two-thirds through a "closed list" proportional
representation system. 2 43 The amendments also reduced the size
of the elected People's Assembly and Shura Council to 498 and
180, respectively. 244
Political parties again rejected these changes. Members of the
Freedom and Justice Party, the Wafd Party, and other political par-
ties criticized the amendments for failing to incorporate their sug-
gestions made during consultations with the SCAF. 2 4 5 As a result,
the parties threatened to boycott parliamentary elections alto-
gether if the September 2011 draft became law.2 4 6 Much of the
criticism focused on Article 5 of Decree No. 120 of 2011, which
prohibited any candidate belonging to a political party from run-
ning in a two-member independent candidate district and forbade
any elected independent candidate from subsequently joining a
political party while in parliament. 247 Civil society organizations
and political parties sought to repeal the article, arguing that the
exclusion of party-backed candidates favors wealthy businessmen
240. See David D. Kirkpatrick & Heba Afify, Steel Tycoon with Links to Mubarak Is Sen-
tenced, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/world/mid-
dleeast/egypt-sentences-mubarak-era-tycoon-ahmed-ezz-to-prison.html (noting that during
the Mubarak regime, prominent NDP Parliamentarian Ahmed Ezz used his political clout
to engage in self-dealing transactions that benefitted Ezz Steel, the leading steel producer
in the Middle East, which was owned by Ezz).
241. BLAYDES, supra note 238, at 54 (noting that elections in Egypt are a sorting mecha-
nism for the distribution of resources and access to state largess and that electoral competi-
tion came to be viewed less as a means for reforming the government or the economy than
as a way to enhance social prestige and personal wealth and influence).
242. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2.
243. Parliamentary Elections Law, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, http://
egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/04/parliamentary-elections-law (last vis-
ited Jan. 9, 2012).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
247. Decree Law No. 120 of 2011 (To Amend Provisions of Law No. 38 of 1972 on the
People's Assembly and Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council), 27 Sept. 2011, art. 5
(Egypt).
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and former NDP members whose financial resources and political
clout would give them an unfair advantage over other independent
candidates. 2" In the wake of this collective rebuke and the elec-
tion boycott threat, the SCAF repealed Article 5 of Decree No. 120
of 2011 in Decree No. 123 of 2011.249 The decision to remove the
bar on independent candidates joining political parties and to per-
mit party candidates to run for independent slots districts with two
seats proved fatal, as it later became the basis for the SCC's dissolu-
tion of parliament in June 2012.250
The final versions of Decrees No. 108, 110, and 120 created a
mixed electoral system for both houses of parliament comprised of
winner-take-all independent candidates and proportional party
representation districts. 25 1 The Decrees set the People's Assem-
bly's membership to 504, with 498 members elected through the
mixed electoral system and ten members appointed by the presi-
dent of the republic.25 2 The Shura Council's membership was set
to 270, with 180 members elected through the mixed electoral sys-
tem and ninety appointed by the president of the republic.253 For
both the People's Assembly and the Shura Council, two-thirds of
the elected seats are elected through proportional party represen-
tation with "closed" party lists and a one-third by winner-take-all
independent candidate process.25"
As described above, the Decrees also abolish the sixty-four-seat
quota for female candidates, requiring instead that parties place at
least one female candidate on each party list.255 However, females
were consistently listed at the bottom of party lists during the 2011-
2012 parliamentary elections. 25 6 As a result of those elections, only
248. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
249. Decree Law No. 123 of 2011, 8 Oct. 2011, art. 1 (Egypt).
250. Case no. 20/34/Constitutional Court (Egypt), available at http://www.earla.org/
news events-detail.php?id=79 (unofficial English translation).
251. See Decree Law No. 108 of 2011 (Concerning Amendments to Law No. 38)), art.
XV (Egypt); Decree Law No. 120 of 2011 (To Amend Provisions of Law No. 38 of 1972 on
the People's Assembly and Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council), 27 Sept. 2011, art.
12 (Egypt).
252. See Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-faida Al-Rasmiyya,
28 Sept. 1972, art. 1 (Egypt).
253. Decree Law No. 120 of 2011 (To Amend Provisions of Law No. 38 of 1972 on the
People's Assembly and Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council), 27 Sept. 2011, art. 3
(Egypt); Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shura Council), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3July
1980, art. 1 (Egypt).
254. ANALYSIs OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 3.
255. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 16.
256. Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, In Egypt's New Parliament, Women Will Be Scarce, NPR (Jan.
19, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/19/145468365/in-egypts-new-parliament-women-
will-be-scarce.
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twelve women were elected or appointed by the SCAF to the Peo-
ple's Assembly and two to the Shura Council.2 57
Ultimately, after a protracted three month election process
involving three rounds of voting across the country, the parliament
was dissolved by an SCC decision that struck down Decrees No. 120
and 123 as unconstitutional. 258 The SCC found two fundamental
flaws with the new election laws. First, granting independent can-
didates a chance to win only one-third of the People's Assembly
violated the principle of equality and equal opportunity ensured by
Article 7 of the Constitutional Declaration.259 Second, allowing
independent candidates to join political parties after being elected
created an unequal advantage where parties ran purportedly inde-
pendent candidates who later formally joined the party.2 6 0 By per-
mitting those belonging to political parties to choose two separate
paths to gain membership into the People's Assembly-the closed
party list system as well as the individual candidacy system-
Decrees No. 120 and 123 violated Article 7 of the Constitutional
Declaration.26 '
To the surprise of the political class, the SCC's recommended
remedy was dissolution of the People's Assembly instead of disqual-
ification of independent candidates. 262 The Court reasoned that
Decrees No. 120 and 123 violated all citizens' political rights,
including the rights of candidacy and voting in elections and refer-
enda.26 3 The Court found that preserving citizens' political rights
was critical to ensure their participation in public life, as such
rights are the democratic means to express their opinions and
elect their representatives in the administration of government in
the country.264 Thus, a voter's right to choose the candidates that
represent their interests was tantamount to their constitutionally
protected political rights. Moreover, any distinction based on party
affiliation created an unfair advantage to some candidates based
on political opinion, which was constitutionally prohibited.265 As a
257. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, supra note 189; Press Release, Carter Ctr.,
Preliminary Statement, supra note 205 (noting that of the 678 members of parliament, only
fourteen are women).
258. See Case no. 20/34/Constitutional Court, (Egypt), available at http://www.earla.
org/news-even tsdetail.php?id=79 (unofficial English translation).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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result, the Court found that the formation of the parliament in its
entirety was invalid, thereby ordering its dissolution. 266
E. Minimal Changes to the Shura Council after the Revolution-Law
No. 120 of 1980
Upon taking office in 1970, President Anwar al-Sadat embarked
on a series of reforms that began an era of political and economic
liberalization. 2 6 7 Known as infitah al-iqtisadi, Sadat's reforms
allowed previously banned political parties to re-enter political life
under a tightly controlled process that ensured the dominance of
the executive branch.268 Sadat sought to create a "state of institu-
tions," whereby citizens would have access to justice and participa-
tion in public life through executive agencies and procedures
within the executive branch.269 In furtherance of his vision, Sadat
expanded the Egyptian parliament by establishing an upper house
known as the "Shura Council" that was comprised of 264 mem-
bers.270 Subsequently, Articles 194 through 205 were added to the
constitution and Law No. 120 of 1980 was promulgated to fulfill
Sadat's political agenda.271
1. A Powerless Legislative Body
Articles 194 through 205 of the 1971 Constitution create the
Shura Council and specify its responsibilities as the upper house of
parliament.272 Legislatively, the Shura Council is limited to approv-
ing the following 273: (1) proposed constitutional amendments; (2)
266. Id.
267. THOMAS W. LIPPMAN, EGvr AFrER NASSER: SADAT, PEACE AND THE MIRAGE OF PROS-
PERITY, ch. 1 (1989).
268. See MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 90.
269. See LIPPMAN, supra note 267, ch. 1.
270. Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shura Council), Al-jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3July
1980 (Egypt).
271. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPr, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May
22, 1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007; Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shura
Council), Al-jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 July 1980 (Egypt).
272. Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shurah Council), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3
July 1980 (Egypt). Law No. 120 of 1980 governs the Shura Council. Id. art. 1. It estab-
lishes a 264-member upper house of parliament, with two-thirds of the members elected by
the people and the remaining one-third appointed by the president. Id. art. 3. All mem-
bers serve six-year terms. Id. art. 6. Law No. 120 stipulates that a candidate must be at least
thirty-five years old, hold a basic education completion certificate, and complete the obli-
gatory military service. Id. arts. 7-8. It also establishes the method for nominating a candi-
date for appointment to the Shura Council. See id.
273. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22,
1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007; Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shura Coun-
cil), AI-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 July 1980 (Egypt).
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draft laws designed to implement certain constitutional provi-
sions; 274 and (3) peace and alliance treaties, and any treaty that
affects the territorial integrity or sovereign rights of the State.2 75
The Shura Council merely consults with the president of the
republic and the People's Assembly regarding276 : (1) drafts of gen-
eral plans for social and economic development; (2) draft laws sub-
mitted to the People's Assembly by the president; and (3) matters
referred to the People's Assembly by the president relating to the
general policy of the State. 277 In addition, the Shura Council issues
reports and submits non-binding recommendations to the presi-
dent and People's Assembly on matters it deems necessary to pre-
serve national unity and the basic foundations of society.2 7 8 None
of the Shura Council's recommendations are binding on the presi-
dent or the People's Assembly,279 making it a relatively powerless
institution.
The Shura Council has long been the subject of criticism by the
Egyptian people for its lack of legislative power and susceptibility to
political cronyism and patronage. 280 When it was established in
1980, President Sadat envisioned it as a body of intellectuals and
technocrats offering non-binding advice to the ministerial cabinet
and the People's Assembly.281 Beyond its executive advisory role,
the Shura Council oversees various government-run "national
councils," whose duties range from establishing journalistic guide-
lines to approving new political parties.282 Within these regulatory
authorities, the Shura Council has the potential to significantly
influence civil society and the democratic process, but remains
outside of the formal legislative process.28 3 For instance, the Shura
Council controls the committees that regulate the media and regis-
274. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22,
1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.; see Law No. 120 of 1980 (Formation of the Shura Council), Al-jarida Al-Ras-
miyya, 3 July 1980, art. 195 (Egypt).
278. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended, May 22,
1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007; Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shura Coun-
cil), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 July 1980, art. 195 (Egypt).
279. Heba Affify, Abdel Rahman Hussein & Christine Kassasseya, Shura Council Elections
Underway, but Many Ask: What's the Point?, EGYPT INDEP. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.egypt
independent.com/node/628356.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. See id.
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tration of new political parties. 284 The Mubarak regime used these
powers to quash political dissent and creation of viable political
opposition parties.285
The rampant corruption under Mubarak and his predecessors
inhibited the Shura Council's potential to strengthen civil society
and bolster democracy in Egypt. Critics often described the Shura
Council as little more than a patronage tool employed by President
Mubarak and the ruling NDP to reward loyal members.286 A noto-
rious example is Safwat El-Sherif, who served as Mubarak's minister
of information for twenty-two years, beginning in 1981.287 In 2004,
Mubarak promoted El-Sherif to chairman of the Shura Council's
High Consultative Committee. This made El-Sherif by law the
chairman of the influential Political Parties Committee, which
licenses political parties, and the Supreme Press Council, which
appoints chief editors and board chairmen of state-owned press
organizations.28 8 As chairman of the Political Parties Committee,
El-Sherif blocked many opposition forces from obtaining licenses
to form opposition parties. 28 9 As chairman of the Higher Press
Council, El-Sherif wielded his influence to ensure that state-owned
newspapers and magazines drummed up support for Mubarak as
Egypt's indispensable leader.290
Through vote-rigging and elections fraud, the NDP won most of
the Shura Council's contested two-third seats.29 1 Meanwhile, Presi-
dent Mubarak routinely exercised his power to appoint one-third
of the Shura Council in favor of NDP members, giving the ruling
party a virtual monopoly over the Shura Council. 292 The NDP
exploited its political dominance of the Shura Council to regulate
the press and deny licenses for political opponents seeking to form
new political parties.293 As a result, there have been numerous
calls for its abolition before and after the January 25 Revolution.294
284. TOBY MENDEL, POLITICAL AND MEDIA TRANSITIONS IN EGYPT: A SNAPSHOT OF MEDIA
POLICY AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 7-10 (2011) (reporting the Shura Council's regula-
tion of the media).
285. See id. at 5-10.
286. Affify, Hussein & Kassasseya, supra note 279.
287. Gamal Essam El-Din, El-Sherf Sorour and Azmi: Mubarak's Top Henchmen at jail's
Doors, AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 10, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/
9 6 7 3/Egypt/ESherif,-Sorour-and-Azmi-Mubaraks-top-henchmen-at.aspx.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. BLAYDES, supra note 238, at 40.
292. Affify, Hussein & Kassasseya, supra note 279.
293. BLAYDES, supra note 238, at 40, 112.
294. Affify, Hussein & Kassasseya, supra note 279.
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2. The Same Shura Council after the Revolution
In contrast to those concerning the People's Assembly, the laws
governing the Shura Council elections underwent minimal post-
revolution changes. In Decree No. 120 of 2011, the SCAF
decreased the minimum age for Shura Council candidates from
thirty to twenty-five, 295 increased the total seats from 264 to 270
seats, and increased the number of appointed seats from eighty-
eight to ninety.2 9 6 Consequently, the president continues to wield
significant influence over the Shura Council. Nevertheless, the
post-revolution Shura Council still lacks the authority to promul-
gate legislation,297 thus limiting its ability to affect legal reforms.
As a consequence, only 10% of eligible voters participated in the
2012 Shura Council election, compared with the 70% that partici-
pated in the People's Assembly elections.298
Of the 180 contested seats, two-thirds (120 seats) are elected
through the proportional representation system and one-third
(sixty seats) are elected through the independent candidate sys-
tem. 299 The 180 elected members elected from thirty-two-member
independent candidate districts and thirty-four-member propor-
tional representation districts.300 The same rules and considera-
tions governing the independent candidate and proportional
systems in the People's Assembly, including the workers and farm-
ers quota, apply to the Shura Council elections. 30'
To the extent that Egyptians have the political will to transform
the Shura Council into a traditional upper house of parliament
with attendant legislative powers, there is much room for
reform.30 2 One of two reforms should occur. Either the Shura
Council should be transformed into an upper house of parliament
with legislative authorities to make law, or the Shura Council
should be abolished to prevent the executive branch from exploit-
295. BAssIOUNI, supra note 133, at 15.
296. Decree Law No. 120 of 2011 (To Amend Provisions of Law No. 38 of 1972 on the
People's Assembly and Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council), 27 Sept. 2011 (Egypt).
297. See generally Law No. 120 of 1980 (Concerning the Shura Council), Al-arida Al-
Rasmiyya, 3July 1980 (Egypt) (illustrating the Shura Council's inability to make laws by way
of enumerating all of its responsibilities).
298. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 19, 22.
299. Id. at 15. The population in each district is approximately the same, thereby justi-
fying an equal number of political representatives per district. CARTER CTR., PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON ALL THREE PHASES OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 7 (2012).
300. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 6.
301. See supra Part III.D-E (describing Egypt's proportional representation and inde-
pendent candidate election systems in detail).
302. Affify, Hussein & Kassasseya, supra note 279.
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ing it to diminish powers of the People's Assembly, unduly politi-
cize civil society, and impede the formation of a free press.303
F. Presidential Elections before the Revolution-Law No. 174 of 2005
Before the January 25 Revolution, it was onerous for a non-NDP
candidate to get on the presidential ballot. Law No. 174 of 2005
created numerous regulatory hurdles for newcomers to overcome,
resulting in the de facto dominance of the ruling NDP party. A
presidential candidate had to obtain at least 250 written endorse-
ments from elected members of the People's Assembly, the Shura
Council, and local popular councils at the governorate level.30 4 Of
the 250 endorsements, at least sixty-five must come from members
of the People's Assembly, twenty-five from members of the Shura
Council, and ten from every local council in at least fourteen
governorates.305 Similarly, a candidate's political party must have
been "founded at least five years before the starting date of candi-
dature and have been operating uninterruptedly for this period,"
and its members must "have obtained at least 5% of the elected
members of both the People's Assembly and the Shura
Council [.]"306
Although the revolution effectively purged the NDP from its rul-
ing party status, existing laws can foreseeably produce the same
result, but for a different ruling party. Hence, there is merit to
ongoing calls for reform of the presidential election law. Specifi-
cally, parliament should reform the presidential nomination pro-
cess to allow more minority parties and independent candidates to
enter the presidential race.307 In addition, reformation of the pres-
idential election monitoring would assure fair and free elections.308
1. The Presidential Nomination Process
Pre-revolution, Law No. 174 of 2005 established the qualifica-
tions for presidential candidates and the mechanism for supervis-
303. Ammar Ali Hassan, Written on the Wall, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE (Feb. 23-29,
2012), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1086/op7.htm; Affify, Hussein & Kassasseya,
supra note 279; Egypt's New Constitution Likely to Retain Shura Council, GLOBAL TIMES (Sept.
30, 2012), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/736157.shtml (reporting on the conten-
tions within the Constitutional Assembly committee about the future role of the Shura
Council).
304. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 2 (Egypt).
305. Id.
306. Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).
307. See Stilt, supra note 24, at 354-55.
308. Id. at 363-64.
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ing the presidential elections.309 Under this law, a candidate for
president could qualify in one of two ways. Under the first nomina-
tion method a candidate was required to: (1) be an Egyptian citi-
zen with Egyptian parents and not hold any other nationality;310
(2) complete his obligatory military service or receive an exemp-
tion certificate;31I and (3) receive written endorsement from at
least 250 elected members of the People's Assembly, Shura Coun-
cil, and local popular councils on the governorate level.31 2 Alterna-
tively, a political party that obtained a single seat in the People's
Assembly or the Shura Council in the most recent elections could
nominate a presidential candidate who has been a member of its
board for at least one year.313
The pre-revolution presidential nomination process favored
large parties with a significant representation in parliament.3 14
Unless the parliament was composed of numerous political parties,
small or new parties were unlikely to obtain the required 250 signa-
tures to nominate a presidential candidate under the first nomina-
tion method.315 Similarly, independent candidates were de facto
excluded from running for president.316 As discussed in more
detail below, this was problematic because the presidential nomina-
tion process should provide the electorate with meaningful choices
beyond the most powerful and entrenched political parties.3 17
The second nomination method required a nominee to be a
senior board member of a political party with at least one seat in
parliament.318 In 2005, this nomination method resulted in eight
presidential candidates running against President Mubarak in
309. Id. at 353.
310. See Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), A-jarida Al-Ras-
miyya, 2 July 2005, art. 13 (Egypt) (emphasis added) (requiring applicant to declare that
"he is an Egyptian citizen from Egyptian parents that he does not hold any other
nationality").
311. See id. (requiring a document verifying "a military service completion or exemp-
tion certificate").
312. Id. art. 2; Stilt, supra note 24, at 349-50, 354-55.
313. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-]arida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 13 (Egypt) (emphasis added).
314. Stilt, supra note 24, at 346, 349-50, 353-55.
315. Id. at 349-50, 353-57.
316. Id. at 349-50.
317. See infra Part V.
318. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-jarida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 4 (Egypt); Stilt, supra note 24, at 349-50, 353-57.
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Egypt's first multi-party presidential elections. 19 Ayman Nour,320
leader of the liberal Al-Ghad Party, fared best among non-NDP
candidates, garnering 12% of the vote despite reports of wide-
spread election fraud and voter intimidation. 3 2 1 In the year of the
election, Nour was charged by the government for forging docu-
ments used to create his political party, resulting in a five-year
prison sentence.322 Nour's plight was widely criticized by foreign
governments as politicized attempts to stifle political dissent in
Egypt. 323
The enactment of Law No. 173 in 2005 also fortified the ruling
NDP's domination of the parliament.3 2 4 Indeed, in 2010, non-NDP
parties won about 3% (15 of 504 seats) in the People's Assembly as
opposed to 22% in 2005 (98 of 444 seats). 325 Parliamentary repre-
sentation by non-NDP parties became virtually non-existent. The
New Wafd Party, for example, held a mere six seats (1.1% of all
seats) despite being the largest opposition party in 2010.326 As a
practical matter, the overwhelming NDP presence in the parlia-
ment prohibited any political party with less than 5% of the parlia-
mentary seats from fielding a presidential candidate.327 Thus, the
NDP monopolized the Presidency.328
Alternatively, Law No. 174 of 2005 allowed a political party with
at least a single seat in parliament to nominate a senior member of
its board as a presidential candidate, thus providing an avenue for
319. The eight candidates standing against President Mubarak in 2005 were Ayman
Nour (Al-Ghad Party), Numan Gumaa (Wafd Party), Osama Shaltut (Solidarity Party),
Ibrahim Turk (Democratic Union Party), Ahmad Al-Sabahi (Umma Party), Fawzi Ghazal
(Egypt 2000 Party), Mamduh Qinawi (Constitutional Party), and Rifaat Al-Agrudi
(National Concord Party). Profiles: Egypt's Presidential Hopefuls, BBC NEWS, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4193132.stm (last updated Sept. 2, 2005).
320. Ayman Nour is an Egyptian lawyer, former parliamentarian, and founder of the
liberal Al-Chad Party. Ayman Nour, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, http://
egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/09/profile-of-ayman-nour (last visited
Jan. 9, 2013); Profile: Ayman Nour, BBC (Dec. 24, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
4558054.stm.
321. Mubarak Wins Egypt Vote, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2005/09/08/world/main828234.shtml.
322. Ayman Nour, supra note 320.
323. See Profile: Ayman Nour, supra note 320.
324. Egypts Election Primer, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, http://egyptelec-
tions.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/10/egypt's-elections-primer (last visited Jan. 9,
2013); Stilt, supra note 24, at 346.
325. Egypt's Election Primer, supra note 324.
326. See id.
327. Stilt, supra note 24, at 349-50.
328. See id.
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minority parties to nominate a presidential candidate.3 2 9 With
these changes to nomination requirements, in the 2005 presiden-
tial elections, several political parties were able to run a presiden-
tial candidate against Hosni Mubarak.330 Prior to these changes,
the only nomination method available required political parties to
operate for at least five consecutive years and obtain at least 5% of
the seats in both houses of parliament.33 ' Consequently, political
parties faced the specter of meeting a significantly higher thresh-
old in order to nominate a candidate, which would have effectively
prohibited many small-party candidates from running in presiden-
tial elections. 332 This may incentivize smaller parties to form coali-
tions. Law No. 174 of 2005, however, was silent as to whether a
coalition of parties that collectively could meet this heightened
standard may nominate a candidate.
Both nomination methods effectively prevented independent
candidates from running in presidential elections.333 Under the
nomination method requiring endorsement of 250 members of
parliament, independent candidates often lacked the political con-
nections and party ties needed to secure support from a sufficient
number of parliament members. 3 3 4 Similarly, the nomination
method through membership in a political party offered no ave-
nue for independent candidates to run for president because they
would have to officially create a party, but with the strict guidelines,
creating a party was rarely a feasible option.335
Both nomination methods also granted major political parties
significant advantages. Under the pre-revolution version of Law
174, the field of presidential candidates would be limited to those
who compromise their party's platform in exchange for support
from the major parties. Large parties could also leverage their
influence to extract political concessions from smaller parties.
Under the pre-revolution law, voters were denied the opportunity
to select from a diverse candidate pool.3 36
329. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), At-Jarida Al-Rasnziyya,
2 July 2005, art. 4 (Egypt); see also Stilt, supra note 24, at 349-50, 353-57.
330. INT'L REPUBLICAN INST., FINAL REPORT: 2005 PRESIDENTIAL ELEcrION ASSESSMENT IN
EGYr 3 (2005).
331. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-arida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 3 (Egypt) (Article 3 was abrogated in 2012 by Decree Law No. 12.).
332. Stilt, supra note 24, at 354-57.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 349-50, 353-57.
335. Id.
336. Mallat et al., supra note 1, at 186.
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2. The Presidential Elections Commission
Article 76 of the abrogated 1971 Constitution establishes the
PEC to supervise presidential elections.337 Similar to the HEC, the
PEC prior to the revolution was a distinct legal entity composed of
judges and individuals beholden to the dominant political party
that appointed them.3 3 8 The PEC was composed of: (1) the Head
of the SCC, as chair;339 (2) the Head of the Cairo Court of
Appeal;34 0 (3) the most senior deputy judge of the SCC;341 (4) the
most senior deputy judge of the Supreme Court ("Court of Cassa-
tion"); 3 4 2 (5) the most senior deputy judge of the State Council;3 43
and (6) five public figures "recognized for their impartiality," three
of whom are chosen by the People's Assembly and two by the
Shura Council upon a recommendation of the bureaus of both
chambers. 344
The PEC's primary functions were to: (1) declare the opening of
the candidate selection process and supervise procedures for fixing
the final list of candidates;345 (2) supervise balloting and vote-
counting procedures;3 46 (3) receive and examine candidate appli-
cations, and verify that they meet relevant requirements; 34 7 (4)
announce election results;34 8 (5) rule on appeals, challenges, and
all matters related to its jurisdiction, including conflicts ofjurisdic-
tion;3" 9 and (6) develop by-laws and the procedures for the dis-
charge of its functions.350
337. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 76, Sept. 11, 1971, as
amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007; Stilt, supra note 24, at 351.
338. Stilt, supra note 24, at 363.
339. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-Jaida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 5 (Egypt).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. The Supreme Court's (Court of Cassation) jurisdiction includes consideration
of appeals brought to it from the Court of Appeals by either an adversarial party or public
prosecutor and examination of lawsuits that arose from a judge's action. Wahab, supra
note 8, § 6.4.
343. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-jaida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 5 (Egypt).
344. Id. Article 5 does not specify what qualifications a political must have to be "rec-
ognized for their impartiality." Stilt, supra note 24, at 351.
345. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT art. 76, Sept. 11, 1971, as
amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007; Stilt, supra note 24, at 351.
346. Stilt, supra note 24, at 351.
347. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-Jaida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 8 (Egypt); Stilt, supra note 24, at 350-51.
348. Stilt, supra note 24, at 351.
349. See id.
350. Id.
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As Egypt's 2012 presidential elections neared, the PEC became
the target of criticism by various Egyptian stakeholders.3 5 1 The
PEC lacked credibility because political parties selected half of its
members via a highly politicized system favoring the dominant
party.352 Thus, minority parties were structurally disadvantaged by
the non-judicial PEC appointees' inevitable loyalty to the majority
party. This became the basis for demands to transform the PEC
into a fully judicial entity.3 53
G. The Post-Revolution Presidential Elections Law-Law No. 174
of 2005
The protracted negotiation process for amending parliamentary
election laws informed and expedited the process for amending
presidential election laws. The SCAF's initial proposed law
included many of the same reforms passed for parliamentary elec-
tions, including depoliticizing the PEC by making itjudicially man-
aged. 35 4 Notwithstanding the negotiations between the SCAF and
political parties, the SCAF established the rules that dictated the
manner and time of the elections as part of the Constitutional Dec-
laration issued on March 30, 2011.355
On January 18, 2012, just five days before the new People's
Assembly took office, the SCC declared unconstitutional the
SCAF's draft law regulating the 2012 presidential elections.356 The
Court's objections were largely technical rather than substantive.35 7
In particular, the Court struck down a provision mandating that
the chairmanship of the PEC should pass to the president of the
Cairo Court of Appeals in the event that the chief justice of the
351. Al-Masry Al-Youm, MP Says Provision Regulating Presidential Election Committee Will
Not Be Modified, EGYPT INDEP. (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/
675941; Stilt, supra note 24, at 363.
352. Stilt, supra note 24, at 350.
353. Election Administration, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, http://egyptelec-
tions.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/27/election-administration (last visited Jan. 9,
2013) (highlighting that opposition figures included judicial supervision of election in
their demands).
354. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 28 (listing the judicial figure-
heads composing the PEC).
355. BAssIOUNI, supra note 133, at 6.
356. Al-Masry Al-Youm, Presidential Election Draft Law Unconstitutional, Says Egyptian
Court, EGYPT INDEP. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/presiden-
tial-election-draft-law-unconstitutional-says-egyptian-court.
357. Nathan J. Brown & Mara Revkin, Egypt's Supreme Court Ruling on the Presidential
Election Law: Road Block or Minor Speed Bump for the Military , ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Jan. 19,
2012), http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/egypt%E2%80%99s-supreme-court-ruling-presi-
dential-election-law-road-block-or-minor-speed-bump-mi.
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SCC steps down as PEC chair.358 The Court held that this stipula-
tion violates articles of the March 30 Constitutional Declaration,3 59
which required that the chairmanship transfer to the oldest vice
presidents of the Court.3 6 0 The Court also clarified the eligibility
requirements for presidential candidates through an anti-fraud
mechanism that required notarization of the 30,000 signatures sub-
mitted by a potential presidential candidate.36' Moreover, the
Court instituted a more restrictive definition of Egyptian citizen-
ship.3 62 Finally, the Court authorized a two-day voting period.363
The Court's rejection of the draft law left the SCAF in a race
against time to draft and pass a presidential election law that would
pass constitutional muster before the first session of parliament
commenced onJanuary 23, 2012.364 In fact, the SCAF did just that,
and on January 19, 2012, the SCAF issued Decree No. 12 of 2012,
which comprehensively amended Egypt's presidential election law.
Most notably, the Decree changes the presidential qualifications
and the mechanism for supervising presidential elections.3 65 Post-
revolution, a presidential candidate must: (1) be an Egyptian citi-
zen without dual citizenship and have Egyptian parents, neither of
which can hold dual citizenship;366 (2) complete his or her obliga-
tory military service or receive an exemption certificate; 67 and (3)
receive written endorsement from at least thirty elected members
of parliament or a total of 30.000 eligible voters from fifteen
governorates. 368 The 30,000 eligible voters must include at least
1,000 eligible voters from each of the fifteen governorates. 369
Neither an elected member of parliament nor an eligible voter
358. Id.
359. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 28. Referendum mandates the
commission to be initially chaired by the president of the SCC. Id. In striking down the
provision mandating the chairmanship transfer to the president of the Cairo Court of
Appeals, the SCC held that Article 28's mandate implies that the chairmanship should
transfer to the next senior most judge of the SCC, not to the president of the Cairo Court
of Appeals. Id.
360. Brown & Revkin, supra note 357.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elections), Al-jarida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 13 (Egypt).
367. Id.
368. Decree Law No. 12 of 2012 (Concerning Amendments to the Presidential Elec-
tions Law), art. 2 (Egypt).
369. Id.
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may endorse more than one presidential candidate.3 70 Moreover,
a candidate cannot be married to a non-Egyptian and must be at
least forty years old.3 7 1
Alternatively, a political party that obtains a single seat in the
People's Assembly or the Shura Council in the most recent elec-
tions may nominate a presidential candidate from their party mem-
bership. 372 The changes to the endorsement requirements lower
the threshold for becoming a presidential candidate, enabling
smaller parties to nominate presidential candidates more easily.
Indeed, over five hundred individuals sought a place on the 2012
presidential ballot.3 73
Post-revolution law also imposed a 10 million Egyptian pound
limit on campaign budgets to curtail the advantages of wealthy can-
didates, although the requirement was not fully enforced in the
2011-2012 elections.374 In addition, future presidents cannot serve
more than two four-year terms and the president is required by law
to appoint a vice president within the first month of taking
office.3 7 5  These two provisions are especially salient in Egypt
because Mubarak ran for six-year terms indefinitely and refused to
appoint a vice president for almost his entire thirty-year tenure.3 7 6
In addition to providing laxer nomination requirements, Decree
No. 12 of 2012 makes significant changes to the composition and
function of the PEC.3 77 The Decree removes political appointees
from PEC membership, limiting the PEC's composition to the fol-
370. Id.
371. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 26.
372. Decree Law No. 12 of 2012 (Concerning Amendments to the Presidential Elec-
tions Law), art. 3 (Egypt).
373. Hamza Hendawi, Hundreds Prepare Candidacies as Egypt's Presidential Election Cam-
paign Kicks Off GLOBAL EDMONTON (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.globaltvedmonton.com/
hundreds+prepare+candidacies+as+egypts+presidential+election+campaign+kicks+off/
6442600717/story.html.
374. BAssIOUNI, supra note 133, at 6. But see Yang Xin, High Expenses of Election Cam-
paigns, CCTV (May 23, 2012), http://arabic.cntv.cn/program/newsar/20120523/115137.
shtml (noting that all of the presidential candidates violated the ten million Egyptian
pound limit on campaign expenses); Yasser Barakat, Illegal Wealth Rules Egypt (May 21,
2012), http://www.elmogaz.com/weekly/26/may/12/30829 (reporting that Shafiq spent
over 300 million Egyptian pounds and Morsi spent 250 million Egyptian pounds on the
first round of the 2012 presidential elections).
375. See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, arts. 77, 139.
376. Peter Kenyon, Egypt's Mubarak: A Cautious, Heavy-Handed Ruler, NPR (Feb. 11,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/11/133665161/egypts-mubarak-a-cautious-heavy-
handed-ruler (noting Mubarak did not appoint a vice president until January 2011).
377. See CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 28.
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lowing judges378 : (1) the head of the SCC, as chair; (2) the head of
the Cairo Court of Appeals; (3) the most senior deputy judge of
the SCC; (4) the most senior deputy judge of the Court of Cassa-
tion; and (5) the most senior deputy judge of the State Council.379
In the event that the head of the SCC is unable to serve as chair,
the most senior deputy of the SCC shall replace him or her in this
role.38 0 If any member other than the chair is unable to serve on
the PEC, the next most senior judge of the same court shall replace
that member.38'
Critics of the PEC had long complained that the political
appointments undermined the PEC's independence by giving the
ruling party great influence in how the PEC supervised presidential
elections and investigated voting irregularities. 38 2 Decree No. 12 of
2012 depoliticizes the PEC's membership by eliminating the
requirement that the People's Assembly and Shura Council
appoint five public figures to the PEC.3 8 3 The transition to full
judicial membership is supposed to strengthen the PEC's ability to
carry out its duties without undue influence from political parties.
Despite these constructive developments, Decree No. 12 of 2012
has two major flaws. First, the decree immunizes PEC decisions
from appeal because Article 28 of the interim Constitutional Decla-
ration bars the right to appeal a PEC decision, thus vesting the PEC
with unchecked authority and no oversight.384 Proponents of this
378. Decree Law No. 12 of 2012 (Concerning Amendments to the Presidential Elec-
tions Law), art. 5 (Egypt).
379. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATION, supra note 21, art. 28.
380. See Nathan Brown & Mara Revkin, Egypt's Supreme Court Ruling on the Presidential
Election Law: Road Block or Minor Speed Bump for the Military?, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Jan. 19,
2012), http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/egypt%E2%80%99s-supreme-court-ruling-presi-
dential-election-law-road-block-or-minor-speed-bump-mi; see also Decree Law No. 12 of
2012 (Concerning Amendments to the Presidential Elections Law) (Egypt).
381. See Decree Law No. 12 of 2012 (Concerning Amendments to the Presidential Elec-
tions Law) (Egypt).
382. See INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL Sys., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: KEY CHALLENGES FOR
CREDIBLE AND COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS 9-10 (2011).
383. Compare Decree Law No. 12 of 2012 (Concerning Amendments to the Presidential
Elections Law) (Egypt) (omitting requirement of Shura Council and People's Assembly to
appoint members to the PEC), with Law No. 174 of 2005 (Regulating the Presidential Elec-
tions), AI-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 2 July 2005 (Egypt) (regulating the presidential elections and
requiring the Shura Council and the People's Assembly to appoint members of the PEC).
384. Gamal Essam El-Din, Legitimacy ofEgypt's Presidential Elections Commission Questioned,
A-IRA-M ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/36859/
Egypt/Politics-/-Legitimacy-of-Egypts-presidential-elections-commi.aspx [hereinafter El-
Din, Legitimacy]; Gamal Essam El-Din, Idiot's Guide to Egypt's Presidential Elections 2012,
ASWAT MASRIYA (Mar. 12, 2012), http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=
febeea0e-7064-4f5f-b395-acd683b42adc [hereinafter El-Din, Idiot's Guide].
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rule have argued that a right to appeal would leave the legitimacy
of the newly elected president on uncertain grounds and is other-
wise unnecessary because the PEC is already comprised of judges
from Egypt's highest courts.385 Opponents of a judicially-run com-
mission are calling for an independent elections commission simi-
lar to those found in North Mrica, India, and Ghana.3 8 6
Meanwhile, even supporters of a judicially-run system challenge
the Decree's anti-democratic method (i.e., the SCAF amending a
law passed by public referendum).387 This argument, however, is
belied by the numerous decrees unilaterally passed by the SCAF
without any input from the public, much less a parliament. In any
event, the point is moot because the new constitution replaces the
PEC with a new body that is subject to regulation by the
parliament.388
The absence of independent oversight of PEC decisions risks a
repeat of past abuses of authority, even given the replacement of
PEC's political appointees with judicial appointees. Although
Egyptians trust the judiciary, the process remains structurally
flawed and prone to politicization, particularly if the judiciary lacks
independence.3 8 9  Indeed, the presiding head of the SCC at the
time, Farouk Sultan, was perceived by some Egyptians as loyal to
the Mubarak regime. 39 0 Specifically, Sultan was suspected of rig-
ging the past elections of the Lawyers' Syndicate to prevent
Islamists from winning.39' Prior to Sultan, Mubarak had appointed
385. El-Din, Idiot's Guide, supra note 384 (quoting PEC's Farouk Sultan as justifying the
no appeals rule by saying: "This immunity is necessary because members of HEC represent
the highest judicial authorities in Egypt and also because opening the door to filing
appeals leaves the legitimacy of the newly-elected president on shaky grounds").
386. KHALIL ET AL., supra note 100, at 15 (recommending that all administrative
decrees, including decrees from the PEC, be subject to judicial review).
387. El-Din, Legitimacy, supra note 384.
388. See CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT arts. 208, 228, 26 Dec. 2012,
translated by Nivien Saleh, The 2012 Constitution ofEgypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index,
NIVIEN SALEH, http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012-translation (last visited Feb.
12, 2013) (unofficial translation).
389. See CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19 (highlighting the numerous ways in which
Egypt's judiciary is vulnerable to improper interference by the executive branch); see also
Egypt: Widespread Military Torture of Protestors Arrested in May, Hum. RTs. WATCH (May 19,
2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/19/egypt-widespread-military-torture-protes-
ters-arrested-may [hereinafter Widespread Military Torture ofProtestors] (reporting the judici-
ary's failure to act on violent, arbitrary, and unlawful military action against protestors).
390. Kareem Fahim, Turmoil in Egypt Race Puts Spotlight on Panel's Motives, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/world/middleeast/turmoil-in-
egypt-elections-puts-spotlight-on-panels-motives.html; see also KHALIL ET AL., supra note 100,
at 15 (recommending a restriction on the president's discretionary power to appoint the
chief justice of the SCC as a means of bolstering the independence of the judiciary).
391. El-Din, Legitimacy, supra note 384.
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Fathi Nagib in 2001, Mamduh Mara'i in 2003, and Prosecutor Gen-
eral Maher 'Abd al-Wahed in 2006 as the SCC's chiefjustice, all of
whom had demonstrated their loyalty to the Mubarak regime dur-
ing their careers in the Ministry of Justice.3 92
In response to reformers' demands and presumably behind the
scenes lobbying by the judiciary, the military in June 2011 issued a
decree that restricts the president's choices for the position of
chief justice of the SCC to the Court's three most senior members
and requires the agreement of the General Assembly of the Court's
justices for the appointment to proceed.393 Despite this reform,
the SCC has faced political pressure from the parliament to reverse
its disqualification of ten presidential candidates. 3 9 4 Should such
incidents become the norm, the judiciary's independence will be
in jeopardy. Therefore, an independent elections commission,
instead of a judicial body, may be a better option that permits de
novo judicial review and avoids ensnaring the judiciary in election
disputes. 95
The significant legitimacy deficit surrounding past presidential
elections warrants reforms that ensure a fair and neutral elections
oversight process. Because the PEC has exclusive authority to mon-
itor all stages of the election, ranging from the registration process
to the counting of votes and announcing the results, an indepen-
dent appeal process is essential.396 The next few presidential elec-
tions will determine if Egypt can shed its authoritarian history and
permit the people to peacefully remove an unpopular or incompe-
392. MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 198-99, 205, 216.
393. Brown, supra note 119.
394. Dina Ezzat, The Final Countdown, A-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE (May 10-16, 2012),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1097/frl.htm.
395. But see Fahim, supra note 390 (noting how currently the election commission has
broad powers to oversee the election with little to no oversight).
396. See id. (noting the populace's distrust of the current system and the lack of availa-
ble review). In light of the Muslim Brotherhood's sweeping victory in the post-revolution
parliamentary elections, Egyptians are rightfully wary of abuses committed by any new
dominant party. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, supra note 189. The Muslim
Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafi al-Nour Party collectively secured
356 seats, or 71.47%, of the total 498 elected seats in the People's Assembly. Id. Similarly,
these two parties combined won 150 seats, or 83.3%, of the total 180 elected seats in the
Shura Council. Results of Shura Council Elections, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE
(Feb. 29, 2012), http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/29/results-of-
shura-council-elections. Thus, for opposition parties to nominate a presidential candidate,
they will need the endorsement of the Freedom and Justice Party or the Al-Nour Party.
Law No. 174 of 2005 (Law on Regulating the Presidential Elections), AI-Jaida Al-Rasmiyya,
2 July 2005, art. 2 (Egypt) (mandating that presidential candidates need 250 written
endorsements-at least sixty-five from the People's Assembly and twenty-five from the
Shura Council-to be an eligible candidate).
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tent president-making the legitimacy and efficacy of the PEC all
the more important.
IV. THE CASE FOR ELECTION REFORMS IN EGYPT
While post-revolution amendments to election laws improve
transparency and independent oversight of Egypt's electoral sys-
tem, additional legislative improvements are needed to establish a
fair, free, and accessible electoral process for all Egyptians. In par-
ticular, women and Copts are currently unlikely to attain represen-
tation in parliament in proportion to their percentage of the
population. Historic biases coupled with structural impediments
to elected office warrant remedial programs to ensure adequate
representation of women's diverse interests.39 7 As women's partici-
pation in electoral politics normalizes over time, remedial mea-
sures such as quotas or gender ordering on party lists can be
phased out. Moreover, the increasing calls for political interfer-
ence with the judicially-run PEC warrant creation of an indepen-
dent elections commission whose decisions are subject to judicial
review. This common international practice preserves the inde-
pendence of the judiciary while preventing the executive branch
from corrupting the elections process.
The following sections examine the shortcomings of election
laws insofar as they adversely impact women and Egyptian Copts,
hinder transparency, compromise the independence of the judici-
ary, and create electoral uncertainties that engender political insta-
bility. Section A examines election laws' failure to meaningfully
broaden access to political office beyond a class of elite and politi-
cally connected Muslim males. Section B analyzes the adverse
impact of the abolition of the sixty-four-member quota for female
representation in parliament and discusses whether a similar quota
is needed for Coptic candidates. Sections C highlights additional
shortcomings of the recent reforms by focusing on the reforms'
failure to mandate that the HEC implement transparent proce-
dures for promulgating electoral rules and tallying votes.
397. See, e.g., EGYPTIAN CTR. FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS, IN 2012 PARLIAMENT.. WHAT WOMEN
LOST AND WHAT EGYrr LosT?! 1 (2012) (noting that Egypt is ranked 121 out of 134 coun-
tries in gender disparities in economic participation, among other indicators of gender
empowerment).
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A. Inadequate Representation of Women and Coptics in Parliament
Historically, Egypt has failed to meaningfully include women
and Copts in political life.39 8 After decades of international advo-
cacy calling for more female representation in parliament,399 as
well as a UN recommendation that nations take special measures
to increase women's representation in public life,40 0 the Mubarak
government relented in 2010 and mandated a quota for sixty-four
women to serve in the People's Assembly.401 While a quota is not a
flawless option for increasing women's representation, it facilitates
normalization of female participation in elected office until such
time that intervention is no longer needed to produce propor-
tional representation of women.4 0 2
Soon after taking control of the executive branch in 2011, the
SCAF eliminated the female quota, which resulted in a dismally low
number of women in the 2012 People's Assembly.403 Political par-
ties exacerbated this regression in gender rights through a refusal
to list female candidates at the top of their party lists, which nearly
guaranteed women's exclusion from parliament.404 Many women,
therefore, view the 2011 election results as a betrayal of Egyptian
women's significant sacrifices in the January 25 Revolution. 405
398. Julie Tomlin, Egypt Election: No Revolution for Women, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/dec/01/egypt-revolution-women-elections.
399. See generally Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, supra note 37. Egypt became a signatory party to CEDAW on July 16, 1980. Id.
400. "[The CEDAW] [r]ecommends that States Parties make more use of temporary
special measures such as positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems to
advance women's integration into education, the economy, politics and employment."
Int'l Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and General Recom-
mendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General Recommendation No. 5,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. II) (May 27, 2008).
401. See Evan Hill, Women Make Leap in Egypt Parliament, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/11/2010111813029420433.html. But
see Aili Mari Tripp, Do Arab Women Need Electoral Quotas, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/19/do-arab_women-needelectoral
quotas (noting how Egypt has since done away with its quota law altogether).
402. Beydoun, supra note 35, at 74; see also Tripp, supra note 401.
403. Beydoun, supra note 35, at 73; Trudy Rubin, Egyptian Women Fighting for Rights,
PHILLY.COM (June 11, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-06-11/news/32157062_1_
ahmed-shafik-egyptian-women-head-scarf (noting that women only occupied 2% of the
seats parliament after the quota-less election in fall 2011).
404. Beydoun, supra note 35, at 99; Rubin, supra note 403 (noting that nearly all parties
put female candidates low on their lists).
405. Garcia-Navarro, supra note 256 (quoting female youth activist Dalia Ziada, "It
really hurts so much when the same people you were within that square that day, who
fighting against the regime .. . are now turning against you. It's like betrayal, betrayal from
our companions."); Egypt Women's March Attacked on Tahrir Square, AFP (June 8, 2012),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iNe-ZYNymOeZXOulh9mvGgF
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Despite the millions of women who protested beside their male
compatriots, only twelve women are in the People's Assembly and
five in the Shura Council in 2012.406
For Egypt's Coptic minority, proportional representation is par-
ticularly problematic because of their geographic concentration in
a few districts. 40 7 Coptic candidates may be able to win some seats
in Cairo, Upper Egypt, and Alexandria, where they constitute a
critical mass of the population. 408 However, in areas where Copts
are not concentrated, they are unlikely to be nominated to a
party's list. Even when they do manage to appear on a party's list,
they will join women at the bottom. 409 As a result, their representa-
tion in the parliament is not proportional to their percentage in
the population. 410
1. Proactive Measures Are Necessary to Ensure Gender Parity in
Politics
Other countries' experiences suggest that a proportional repre-
sentation system is best suited for promoting election of female
WoRCA?docld=CNG.995fdb44bf33365f355136a6af69b2c9.221 (reporting that women
faced and still face sexual and physical assaults as a result of participating in protesting);
Rubin, supra note 403 (noting that military brutalized peaceful female demonstrators and
forced them to take virginity tests). "On Jan. 25, me and my mother and sisters convinced
my father and brothers to join us . . . . We women stood at the forefront of the security
barriers so the men could pass behind us .... We broke the security barriers till we got to
Tahrir Square," said Sondos Asem, editor of the Muslim Brotherhood's English-language
site. Josh Dzieza, After the Arab Spring, Are Egypt's Women Losing Ground?, DAILY BEAST (Mar.
9, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/09/after-the-arab-spring-are-
egypt-s-women-losing-ground.html.
406. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, supra note 189. Two of the twelve women
were appointed to the People's Assembly: Maryann Malaak Kemaal and Suzy Adly Nashed.
Egypt's Military Leader Directly Appoints Five Copts to Parliament, AssYRIAN INT'L NEWs AGENCY
(Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.aina.org/news/20120122 1 2 3 9 2 9 .htm; see also, e.g., Press
Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary Statement, supra note 205 (noting that only five women
were elected to the Shura Council); Widespread Military Torture of Protestors, supra note 389
(offering victims' direct accounts of the military's arbitrary, unjustified arrests, beatings,
and torturing of female protestors following the early May 4, 2012, protest near the
Defense Ministry, including testimony of whipping, electroshocking, and physical beating).
407. Mohammad Abu Dahab, Gharbia Copts Reluctant to Run in Elections, EGYPr VOTES
(Jan. 11, 2012), www.egyptvotes.org/en/politics/item/430-gharbia-copts-reluctant-to-run-
in-elections.html.
408. Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election, supra note 189.
409. See Dahab, supra note 407 (finding in the Gharbia governorate only five Copt can-
didates for parliamentary elections out of a total of 521 candidates).
410. Copts make up approximately 10% of Egypt's population but they represent less
than 2% of members of parliament. Abdel Rahman Youssef, Egyptian Copts: It's All in the
Numbers, AL-AKHBAR ENGLISH (Sept. 30, 3012), http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12728;
see also infra notes 463-470 and accompanying text.
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and ethnic minority candidates. 4 1 1 Female representation in par-
liaments is approximately twice as high in countries with propor-
tional representation electoral systems than in countries that use
majority or plurality electoral systems. 4 12 However, Egyptian politi-
cal parties' refusal to include female candidates at the top of their
party lists, despite initial promises to do so,"' 3 evinced that more
affirmative measures are needed. In order for Egypt to adequately
recognize Egyptian women's contributions to the nation, the gov-
ernment should either reinstate its previous female candidate
quota or follow a model used by Tunisia that mandates as a matter
of law that every other candidate be a woman on political party
lists.414 Absent such measures, Egyptian women will continue to be
denied their rightful place in government despite their substantial
contribution to the January 25 Revolution and society at large.41 5
Despite attaining suffrage in 1956, Egyptian women have not
been sufficiently represented in parliament. 4 16 The Mubarak
regime established the female candidate quota in 2010, which
increased the percentage of females in the People's Assembly from
8% in 20074" to 12.70% in 2010.418 The quota system was in effect
for only two legislative terms, or ten years, and some viewed the
system as an attempt to change deep-seated popular views oppos-
ing women serving in elected office.419
Employing quotas to increase women or minority representation
in public life is a subject of contention among academics and
policymakers. While the underlying theories on the efficacy of
gender quotas are not the focus of this Article, it is worth highlight-
ing the key arguments in favor and against the use of gender quo-
tas. Proponents argue that quotas are not preferential treatment
or positive discrimination, but rather affirmative action and
411. Karen Bird, The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established
Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research 17 (Acad. for Migration Studies in Den.,
Working Paper Series, 2004); see also Tripp, supra note 402.
412. DAHLERUP& FREIDENVALL, supra note 220, at 10.
413. EGYPTiAN cTR. FOR I'OMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 397 (reporting Egyptian political
parties' broken promises to support a requirement that at least one woman be listed at the
top of each party list).
414. Tripp, supra note 401; see also Beydoun, supra note 35, at 66 (finding Tunisia has
the highest percentage of female participation in the Arab region).
415. See Rubin, supra note 403 (quoting the president of Egypt's National Council for
Women, who observed that parliament must be monitored to ensure they do not make
further attempts to revoke rights for women).
416. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 10.
417. See id.
418. Elections Held in 2010, supra note 127.
419. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 10.
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attempts to remedy inequities produced by deep-rooted privilege
and to achieve justice. 4 2 0 Proponents highlight the distinction
between "equal opportunities" and "equality of results." 4 2 1 While
equal opportunity may offer women the legal right to fully partici-
pate in the electoral process, it does not necessarily follow that
Egypt will achieve equality of results just because representation of
women is demanded or expected. 422
Meanwhile, opponents of quotas start from the position that
political representation is about the representation of ideas and
interests, not gender or the representation of social groups.4 2 3 Of
course, this assumes that the interests of men and women in society
do not diverge according to their different social status and exper-
iences. Those opposed to quotas argue they contradict the princi-
ple of equal opportunity and equal treatment because women are
given priority over men.4 2 4 Thus, quotas become discriminatory as
one group of candidates is favored at the expense of better-quali-
fied candidates.425  The common response to this critique is to
highlight the disparities in treatment, social status, and opportuni-
ties for women that contribute towards a candidate's qualifica-
tions.426 Hence, failing to take affirmative measures perpetuates
the underlying disparities that prevent women from winning with-
out such measures. Some critics also point out that affirmative
measures such as quotas cast a suspicion on all women who have
attained positions of power that their success is due to special treat-
420. DAHLERUP & FREIDENVALL, supra note 220, at 20.
421. DRUDE DAHLERUP, QUOTAS - A JUMP To EQUALITY? THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS OF THE USE OF ELECTORAL QUOTAS TO OBTAIN EQUAL POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP
FOR WOMEN 4 (2002). Proponents have proffered four primary arguments in support of
women's equal representation in governance. Id. The 'justice argument" takes the posi-
tion that women represent half of the population and thus have the right to half the seats.
Id. The "experience argument" contends that women have different experiences (either
biologically or socially constructed) that ought to be represented in government. Id. The
"interest group argument" accepts that women and men have partly conflicting interests
and thus men cannot adequately represent women. Id. Finally, the "role model argu-
ment" focuses on the utility of women politicians serving as role models to pave the way for
other women to serve in government. Id. Moreover, proponents argue quotas do not
discriminate, but rather compensate for existing barriers that hinder women from receiv-
ing their fair share of political seats as well as prevent further barriers and mechanisms of
exclusion. Id. In the end, proponents believe that quotas offer an effective mechanism to
integrate women into all facets of society so long as they are thoughtfully implemented and
perceived as legitimate by the electorate. Id.
422. Id.
423. DAHLERUP & FREIDENVALL, supra note 220, at 104.
424. Id. at 20.
425. Id. at 18.
426. DAHLERUP, supra note 421, at 2.
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ment instead of competency.427 Finally, there is the slippery slope
argument that warns of demands for quotas by other groups
thereby resulting in the balkanization of politics based on group
interests. 428 The glaring flaw in this argument is that special inter-
est politics already occurs independent of quotas for reasons unre-
lated to gender inequities.
In Egypt, opponents of quotas prevailed. In July 2011, the SCAF
revoked the quota, leaving little incentive for political parties to
nominate female candidates.429 Instead, the law requires political
parties participating in proportional representation districts to
include at least one female candidate anywhere on their party
lists.430 Parties consistently place women at the bottom of their
list.431 Electoral districts that are often too small to allow more
than one or two parties to win more than one or two seats per
district exacerbate the dim election prospects for female
candidates.432
Tunisia's experience offers valuable insights into another poten-
tial method for expanding female political representation in parlia-
ment.43 3 Tunisia's post-revolution caretaker government crafted
an innovative system to ensure women were represented in the new
Tunisian parliament.43 4 Candidates for 217 seats divided among
thirty-three districts ran as members of party lists under a propor-
tional representation system.435 The electoral rules mandated that
every other candidate on a party list be a woman. 436 Despite these
427. DAHLERUP & FREIDENVALL, supra note 220, at 18 (explaining the argument that
women candidates are less qualified than their male competitors and should not be
ushered into office simply because they are women).
428. Id. at 19.
429. See Male-Dominated Parliament Worries Experts, Candidates, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Dec. 7,
2011), http://dailynewsegypt.com/2011/12/07/male-dominated-parliament-worries-
experts-candidates (quoting Maya Morsy, U.N. Women Country Coordinator, as saying:
"Many factors hinder women's political participation, such as political parties being slow to
respond to women's interest, under-investment in women's campaigns and cultural barri-
ers."); see also Beydoun, supra note 35, at 73.
430. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 16 (reporting the SCAF's abolition of the women's
quota requirement).
431. Rubin, supra note 403.
432. See Egypt's Election Primer, supra note 324; Results of Egypt's People's Assembly Election,
supra note 189 (reporting that no women won seats in individual member district races).
433. Tunisia Election Raises Hope for Arab Women and Democracy: View, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
26, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-26/view-tunisia-election-raises-
hopes-for-arab-women-democracy.html.
434. Id.; Beydoun, supra note 35, at 66.
435. Tunisia Election Raises Hope for Arab Women and Democracy: View, supra note 433.
436. DAPHNE MCCURDY, PROJECT ON MIDDLE E. DEMOCRAcy, A GUIDE TO THE TUNISIAN
ELEcTIONs 3-4 (2011).
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remedial measures, in 2011 only forty-nine women (22.5%) were
elected to Tunisia's 217-member National Constituent Assembly,
which was the body tasked with creating a new Tunisian constitu-
tion after President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was deposed.43 7 These
disproportionately low numbers were a result of parties consist-
ently listing women second in districts where only one seat was
available, thereby guaranteeing only the male candidate a seat
upon the party's victory.438
Political parties in Egypt oppose a gender ordering mandate sim-
ilar to Tunisia's because their success derives from the popularity
of their male candidates.439 In smaller districts where parties tend
to win no more than one or two seats, any perceived external inter-
ference with the formulation of the party list will be met with
strong opposition by the predominantly male party leadership. A
gender ordering mandate would also add an additional layer of
complexity to an already complicated electoral system that imposes
occupational requirements on each district through a mix of pro-
portional representation and independent candidates. 440 Notwith-
standing these challenges, women should not collectively bear the
burden of entrenched male interests.4 4 1  Requiring alternating
437. Duncan Pickard, How Well Did Women Really Fare in Tunisia's Elections?, POWER &
POL'Y (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.powerandpolicy.com/2011/12/06/how-well-did-women-
really-fare-in-tunisia%E2%80%99s-elections. Forty-two of the forty-nine women are from
the El-Nahhda Party, Tunisia's largest Islamist party, which won 47% of all National Consti-
tutional Assembly seats. Eileen Byrne, The Women MPs Tipped to Play Leading Roles in Tuni-
sia's New Assembly, GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
oct/29/women-mps-tunisia-government; Lessons from Constitution Making in Tunisia, kTLAN-
TIC COUNCIL (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.acus.org/event/lessons-constitution-making-
tunisia.
438. McCURDY, supra note 436, at 3-4 (explaining political parties' strategic manipula-
tion of candidate list gender requirements by listing male candidates in the top position
where only winning one seat was expected). The strategic ordering of candidates ensured
that a man would likely be the only winner from that party's candidate list in that district,
putting female candidates at a disadvantage. Id.; see also Eymen Gamha, The Candidates:
Heads of Lists by Party and District, TUNIsA LIVE (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.tunisia-live.net/
2011/10/05/head-of-lists.
439. See Tunisia Election Raises Hope for Arab Women and Democracy: View, supra note 433;
see also Islamist, Liberal Parties Fielded Few Female Candidates, Says Report, DAILY NEWs EGYPT
(Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/02/01/islamist-liberal-parties-
fielded-few-female-candidates-says-report/.
440. See supra Part III.B (providing a detailed description of the occupational require-
ments in Egypt's electoral system).
441. See Beydoun, supra note 35, at 64-65 ("Arab women remain effectively disen-
franchised from the salient processes that shape governance in their respective states. .. . If
we consider political representation as a form of empowerment, a historical survey of the
compositions of Arab parliaments reveals that women have had little or no place in the
most vital political institutions of their home state.") As one well-known Egyptian woman
activist stated, "Egypt needs equality... this is the main problem that the new constitution
612013]
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women on party lists would be a minor burden compared to the
significant sacrifices made by Egyptian women both during the Jan-
uary 25 Revolution and in its aftermath. 4 4 2
Given the political hurdles inherent in implementing Tunisia's
gender ordering model, perhaps the most practical option for
Egypt is to reinstate the 2010 quota for female candidates for the
next parliamentary elections. 443  That quota provision called for
the expansion of the People's Assembly to include sixty-four new
seats for female candidates. 4 4 4 The law created two new seats for
women in twenty-six out of Egypt's then twenty-nine
governorates.445 Female candidates were elected through a simple
majority vote and the occupational requirement did not apply. 446
This system led to a 1500% increase in the number of female par-
must address, whether that's between men and women or Muslim or Christians, regardless
of social status." Bel Trew, Egyptian Women Demand Representation at Parliament Gates, AL
BAWABA (Mar. 10, 2012), http://albawaba.com/editorchoice/egyptian-women-demand-
representation-parliament-gates-416222 (quoting Dr. Laila Soueif).
442. One scholar has aptly framed the nature of such efforts used to achieve gender
equality as follows:
The fast track model implies a shift from one concept of equality to another ....
[Where] the classic liberal notion of equality stressed 'equal opportunity' or
'competitive equality,' [fast track] quotas represent a shift towards 'equality of
results.' According to the former concept, the removal of formal barriers for
women's political participation, such as providing women voting rights, was con-
sidered sufficient. It was then up to individual women to act .... Equal opportu-
nity does not exist just due to the removal of formal barriers, it is argued. Direct
discrimination and a complex pattern of hidden barriers prevent women from
attainting a fair share of political power and influence. Quotas and other mea-
sures aiming at an increased level of women's political participation are this
regarded as means towards equality of results. Equality as a goal cannot be
reached by formal equal treatment solely as a means. If barriers exist, compensa-
tory measures must be introduced as a means to reach equality of result. In this
perspective, quotas are not regarded as discrimination (of men), but as a com-
pensation for structural barriers that women face in the electoral process. Thus,
quotas as a fast track do not only challenge the Scandinavian model of women's
representation, it also questions the concept of equal opportunity by providing
the concept of equality with new significance and implications.
Beydoun, supra note 35, at 72.
443. See, e.g., Press Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary Statement, supra note 205.
444. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, 2010 Human Rights Report: Egypt,
U.S. DEP'T STATE (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/nea/ 154460.
htm.
445. Evan Hill, Women Make Leap in Egyptian Parliament, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/11/2010111813029420433.html.
446. In 2011, the governorates of "6th of October" and "Helwan" were merged into the
governorates of Giza and Cairo, respectively, resulting in twenty-seven total governorates.
See Egypt's PM Centralises Helwan and 6 October Governorates, AHRAM ONLINE (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 1/0/ 10037/Egypt/Egypts-PM-centralises-
Helwan-and-October-governor.aspx.
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liamentarians from a mere four female members in 2005 to sixty-
four in 2010.447
Retroactively applying the female candidate quota is impractica-
ble, as members of the People's Assembly were recently elected
and took office on January 23, 2012.448 Thus, a female quota could
not realistically be imposed until the next elections in 2016, unless
the People's Assembly is expanded to accommodate the quota.
Expanding a 508-member lower house to 572, however, risks creat-
ing an unwieldy chamber whose large size might inhibit its ability
to govern. 449 As an interim, mitigating measure, the president
could be legally mandated to appoint women to all of the ten pre-
sidentially appointed positions in the People's Assembly. 450 While
this would not bring women's political representation to its pre-
revolutionary numbers, it would add ten more members to the dis-
mally low number of women elected to the People's Assembly.45 1
Until the election of women is normalized as part of the Egyp-
tian political experience, remedial measures are necessary to over-
come entrenched biases against women serving in political
office. 4 5 2 Irrespective of the remedial measure adopted-gender
ordering or a quota-Egyptian women deserve to be adequately
represented in both houses of parliament.453 To deny Egyptian
women the right to fully participate in shaping the new Egypt is a
denial of their significant contributions to Egyptian society and a
recipe for second-class citizenship.
447. Hill, supra note 445.
448. Jack Shenker, Egyptian Parliament Sworn in Under Heavy Weight of Expectation,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/23/egyptian-par-
liament-sworn-in-expectation.
449. The threat of political paralysis due to parliament's size is well-documented. For
example, in the 543-member lower house of India's parliament, known as Lok Sabha, polit-
ical paralysis frequently occurs, in part due to the body's sheer size. Election Watch, CNN
(Feb. 23, 2000), http://articles.cnn.com/2000-02-23/world/election.watch-asiapcf
india2_1_election-state-assemblies-fiveyear-terms (reporting 545 seats in the Lok Sabha);
see also Samanth Subramanian, The Long View: Parliamentary Paralysis, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2011), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/the-long-view-parliamentary-paraly-
sis/. In 2011, Lok Sabha passed only fifty-seven out of 200 bills and met just sixty-five days
of the year. See Subramanian, supra.
450. The president of the republic has the power to appoint ten members to the Peo-
ple's Assembly. Legal Research Guide: Egypt, LIBR. CONGRESS (July 26, 2012), http://www.loc.
gov/law/help/egypt.php.
451. Garcia-Navarro, supra note 256.
452. Beydoun, supra note 35, at 71-72; see also Kochan, supra note 33, at 919.
453. "'Women have virtually no representation in parliament, we need to make sure we
are at least half in the constituent assembly,' lamented Ghada Shahbender of the Egyptian
Organization of Human Rights." Trew, supra note 441.
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2. Ensuring Proportional Egyptian Coptic Christian
Representation in Parliament
Although Copts make up approximately 10% of the Egyptian
population, their representation in parliament has declined signifi-
cantly in recent decades.454 Coptic representation in parliament
peaked in 1942, when Copts comprised 10% of members of parlia-
ment, many of whom belonged to the secular Al-Wafd Party.455
Since then, Coptic representation in parliament has gradually
declined.4 5 6
The downward trend began with an official ban in 1953 of all
political parties, including the Al-Wafd Party, as part of a series of
political reforms under President Nasser's Arab socialist agenda. 4 5 7
These reforms implemented socialist policies while promoting
Egypt's Arab character and role as leader of the Arab World.4 58
Institutional efforts to promote Egypt's Arab heritage marginalized
Copts, many of whom identified as Egyptians rather than Arabs.459
Although the ban on political parties was officially lifted in 1976,
Coptic representation in parliament continued to decline follow-
ing the adoption of a winner-take-all, independent candidate sys-
tem in 1990.460 The winner-take-all system disadvantaged minority
candidates, who previously only had to win a predetermined mini-
mum number of votes to secure a parliamentary seat under a pro-
portional representation system. 461 This change, coupled with
growing public disillusionment with the government by both Mus-
lims and Copts, further limited Coptic representation. 462
In 2005, Copts held just 1.5% of seats (approximately half of
which were awarded via presidential appointment) in the People's
Assembly and 2.2% of seats (all of which were appointed) in the
454. Egypt Christians Reject Quota Parliament Seats, AL-ARABIYA NEWS (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://www.alarabiya.net/articIes/2010/11/21/126824.html.
455. See Azmn BISHARA ET AL., DOHA INST., CAN WE SPEAK OF A "COPTIC QUESTION" IN
EGYPT? 10, 14 (2011); see also Egypt Christians Reject Quota Parliament Seats, supra note 454.
456. BISHARA ET AL., supra note 455, at 14-15.
457. LIPPMAN, supra note 148.
458. See Gabriel R. Warburg, Islam and Politics in Egypt: 1952-1980, 18 MIDDLE E. STUD.
131, 140 (1982).
459. See BISHARA ET AL., supra note 455, at 7.
460. See John Ehab, Egypt's Copts Frustrated by Under-Representation in Parliament Polls,
EGYPT INDEP. (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypts-copts-frus-
trated-under-representation-parliament-polls.
461. DUNNE, supra note 51, at 4, 8, 13.
462. MUSTAFA ET AL., supra note 222, at 79 (noting that when minority groups perceive
a type of persecution they tend to withdraw from society).
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Shura Council. 4 63 Low Coptic representation in parliament can be
attributed in part to political parties' unwillingness to nominate
Egyptian Coptic candidates. 4 6 4 In the 2005 People's Assembly elec-
tions, for example, the then-ruling NDP nominated only two Copts
from its list of 444 total candidates.465 In 2010, the NDP's list of
839 candidates included only ten Copts. 4 6 6 Out of a total of 5,725
candidates running for election, just eighty-one-less than 2%-
were Copts. 46 7 Approximately twenty-four Copts ran as opposition
candidates and a number of others as independents, with only two
winning a seat.4 6 8  Due to the abysmally low representation of
Copts, debates ensued on whether the government should adopt a
quota for Coptic candidates similar to the one for women.4 6 9
While some Egyptians argue a quota would be a useful and neces-
sary corrective measure to ensure greater Coptic representation in
parliament, prominent Copts, including the Pope Shenouda III,
rejected the idea out of concern it would trigger religious sectari-
anism in Egypt.4 7 0
Adoption of the proportional representation system increased
Coptic representation in the post-revolution parliament.47 1 In the-
ory, a proportional representation system increases the prospects
of small parties and minority groups in gaining representation in
463. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 11.
464. Joseph Mayton, In Egypt's New Democracy, Copts Feel Sidelined, PERSECUTION.ORG
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.persecution.org/2011/11/ 19/in-egypt's-new-democracy-
copts-feel-sidelined (noting that opposition from Islamists, fears by the church establish-
ment of delving too deeply into politics, and growing pessimism among Copts have all
contributed to little and low Copt representation on party ballots); see also ANALYSIS OF THE
2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 11.
465. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 11.
466. Amr Hamzawy & Michele Dunne, The Egyptian Parliamentary Elections: Facts and
Figures, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, http://egyptelections.carnegieendow-
ment.org/2010/11/28/the-egyptian-parliamentary-elections-facts-and-figures (last visited
Jan. 9, 2013). Among the twenty-four Copts from opposition parties, five were from Al-
Wafd Party, three from Al-Tagammu Party, and four from Al-Ghad Party. d.
467. Yasmine El-Rashidi, Egypt Elections Obliterate Coptic Voice, AHRAM ONLINE (Dec. 5,
2010), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/5/1209/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/
Egypt-elections-obliterate-Coptic-voice.aspx.
468. Id.
469. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 11.
470. Egypt Christians Reject Quota Parliament Seats, supra note 454; Majdi Fikri, NGODirec-
tor: I Called for Parliamentary Quota for Copts, ARAB W. REP. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.
arabwestreport.info/year-2011/week-40/52-ngo-director-i-called-parliamentary-quota-
copts.
471. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 11
(addressing the increase in the number of Copts in parliament from two in 2005 to ten in
2010).
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parliament.472 Electoral districts in proportional representation
systems are always larger than under a winner-take-all system and
fixed according to historical considerations such as traditional geo-
graphic boundaries, demographics, and tribal areas. 473 This pro-
motes greater political participation by minorities because they
need not win a majority of the votes in order to win a parliamen-
tary seat. Instead, smaller political parties need only obtain a pre-
determined minimum number of votes, known as a "baseline."474
In the case of Copts, multi-member districts increase the chances
of election of Coptic candidates in governorates like Minya, Qena,
Sohag, and Assiut, where large concentrations of Copts reside.475
Egypt's mixed proportional representation and independent
candidate system, however, may stunt the possibility for increased
minority representation in Egypt's electoral system. The indepen-
dent candidate system is an American style winner-take-all system
where only the highest vote-getter receives a parliamentary seat.47 6
Egypt's mixed system, known as the "German model," combines
the close ties enjoyed between representatives and constituents in a
winner-take-all system with the fairness and diversity of representa-
tion under a proportional representation system.4 7 7
The absence of a vibrant political environment before the Janu-
ary 25 Revolution favored wealthy businessmen and former NDP
members in parliamentary elections. Indeed, in tribal areas, such
472. DOUGLASJ. Amy, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO VOTING SYSTEMS
70, 72 (2000).
473. Electoral Systems that Delimit Electoral Districts, ACE PROJECT, http://aceproject.org/
ace-en/topics/bd/bda/bdaO1/onePage (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) (noting that under plu-
rality and majority systems, minority political parties whose supporters are not geographi-
cally concentrated usually obtain fewer seats than their proportion of the vote would
suggest they are entitled).
474. See supra Part III.E for more information about the different formulas used for
determining the "quota" or "baseline" that each party must obtain to win a parliamentary
seat.
475. Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, Copts Compete in Minya, DAILY NEWS EGY=r (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/01/04/al-gamaa-al-islamiya-copts-compete-in-minya
(noting Coptic population in Minya); Yasamine Saleh, Christian Governor Must Go, South
Egypt Protesters Say, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://af.reuters.com/article/egyptNews/id
AFLDE73K1NS20110421?sp=true (noting Coptic population in Qena); Ahmed Tolba,
Egyptian Court Sends Christian Student to Jail for Insulting Islam, AL ARABYA NEWS (Apr. 4,
2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/04/04/205477.html (noting Coptic
population in Assiut).
476. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 2.
477. For a discussion of the potential advantages proportional representation offers
over a winner-take-all system, see Amy, supra note 472, at 69-79.
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as Minya, parties founded by former NDP members478 with deep
roots to local tribes and large families did particularly well in the
2011 People's Assembly elections, winning fourteen out of twenty-
four seats through proportional representation.4 79 Similarly, in tri-
bal areas with large Coptic populations, parties such as the
National Party, the Freedom Party, and the Egyptian Citizen Party
placed Coptic candidates on the top of their voter lists, resulting in
their election to parliament. 480 In all, six Copts were elected and
five appointed in the first post-revolution People's Assembly, and
two were elected in the Shura Council.48'
A comparison of the number of Coptic candidates participating
in the People's Assembly elections in 2005 and 2011 highlights
both the advantages and shortcomings of the current electoral sys-
tem. In 2005, the then-ruling NDP nominated just ten Copts out of
478. Former NDP members founded ten different political parties following the disso-
lution of the NDP in 2011. See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 133. Three of these parties
won parliamentary seats: the National Party, founded by the late Talaat Al-Sadat, won six
seats; the Freedom Party, founded by the sons of former NDP member Mohammad Mah-
moud Ali Hussein, fielded over 500 candidates and won four seats; and the Egyptian Citi-
zen Party, founded by former NDP member and construction magnate Alaa Hasaballah,
won four seats. See Egyptian Elections: Preliminary Results, JADALIVA, http://www.jadaliyya.
com/pages/index/3331/egyptian-elections preliminary-results-updated-#Table-summary
(last updated Jan. 9, 2012).
479. Egyptian Elections: Preliminary Results, supra note 478.
480. Copts, Islamists Face Off in Minya Run-Offs, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Jan. 11, 2011), http:/
/dailynewsegypt.com/2012/01/11/copts-islamists-face-off-in-minyas-run-offs. This strategy
of appealing to Coptic voters by placing Coptic candidates at the top of party lists simulta-
neously dilutes the Coptic vote. Id. It entices Coptic voters to choose lists where Coptic
candidates were already likely to win a seat and weakens regional parties such as the Al-
Wafd Party, which traditionally enjoys strong Coptic support. Id. Al-Wafd Party won thirty-
eight seats in the People's Assembly. SHARP, supra note 319, at 3. The Egyptian Bloc, an
alliance between the Free Egyptians Party, Al-Tagammu Party and Egyptian Social Demo-
cratic Part, won thirty seats. Id. The Free Egyptians Party, which was founded by promi-
nent Coptic businessman, Naguib Sawiris, had been expected to do well amongst Coptic
voters. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 50.
481. L. Lavi, People's Assembly Elections in Egypt Yield Victory for Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis;
Down for Liberals, Left, and Revolutionary Youth, MIDDLE E. MEDIA RES. INST. (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.memri.org/report/en/print6052.htm; see also Egypt MP Calls for More Women,
Copts in Constituent Assembly, AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 3, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/35914/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-MP-calls-for-more-women,-Copts-in-con-
stituen.aspx (quoting MP Amr Hamzawy calling for representation of women and Coptics
in parliament). As of the writing of this Article, twelve Copts were appointed to the Shura
Council. Ahmed Aboul Enein, Morsy Appoints 90 Members to Shura Council, DAILY NEWS
EGvYr (Dec. 23, 2012), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/23/morsyappoints-90-
members-to-shura-council. In the now dissolved People's Assembly, five Copts were
appointed and two were elected. Tantawi Directly Appoints Five Copts to Parliament, EGYPT
INDEP. (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/tantawi-directly-
appoints-five-copts-parliament.
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more than 839 candidates.4 8 2  As a consequence, the People's
Assembly consisted of just six Copts, five of whom were appointed
by President Mubarak and one was elected.48 3 In the 2011 People's
Assembly election, 120 Coptic candidates ran for office, marking a
significant increase from past years, yet still constituting a small
number compared to the thousands of candidates who ran in that
election.48 4 While the official results released by the HEC do not
provide a breakdown by religious affiliations, political parties with
strong Coptic support, like The Egyptian Bloc and Freedom Party,
won thirty-four seats combined. 48 5  In addition, the SCAF
appointed five Copts, including two women, among its ten appoin-
tees to the People's Assembly.48 6
One particular reform could go a long way towards increasing
Coptic representation in parliament-requiring that political par-
ties list a Coptic candidate in the top three slots in districts where
Copts comprise at least 10% of the general population. Even with
this reform, the success of minority candidates still depends on
political parties' commitments to include them in party lists. In a
proportional representation system, political parties act as gate-
keepers in the electoral process by choosing which candidates will
run in elections.487 These recommendations also assume there are
checks in place that prevent gerrymandering that dilutes the Cop-
tic population in electoral districts. Because Muslim and Christian
activists rejected a quota for Coptic candidates for fear it would
foment sectarianism, mandatory ordering may be a more politically
palatable alternative.488
482. Mike Elkin, Egypt's Christians Prepare for New Political Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/world/middleeast/egyptian-christians-get-
political.html.
483. ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY, BRANDEIS UNIV., CROWN CTR. FOR MIDDLE E. STUDIES,
PRELUDE TO CHANGE: EGYPTIAN DEMOCRATIZATION, 2005, at 3 (2006).
484. Andre Azzam, A Thousand Parties Running in Egypt's First (Possibly) Free Elections,
ASIA NEWS (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/A-thousand-parties-running-
in-Egypt%E2%80%99s-first-(possibly)-free-elections-23254.html.
485. The Egyptian Bloc is a political alliance between the liberal Tagaamu and Social
Democratic Parties and the Free Egyptians Party, founded by prominent businessman
Naguib Sawiris and favored by many Coptics. BASSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 26, 50. The Al-
Wafd Party, traditionally supported by Coptics, placed third in the elections, winning
thirty-eight seats. The New Al-Wafd Party, GEO. U. BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE, &
WORLD Aff., http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/resources/organizations/the-new-al-
wafd-party (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
486. Tantawi Directly Appoints Five Copts to Parliament, supra note 481.
487. Id.
488. Egypt Christians Reject Quota Parliament Seats, supra note 454.
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B. Bolstering the Independence and Transparency of the
Elections Commissions
While post-revolution amendments to laws governing the HEC
are significant,489 additional reforms are needed to strengthen the
HEC's independence and transparency. Removal of political
appointments to the HEC, and use ofjudges, is a positive develop-
ment;4 9 0 however, Law No. 38 of 1972 lacks express language stipu-
lating that the HEC is a dejure independent entity.4 9 Despite the
relative independence of the Egyptian judiciary, judges are still sus-
ceptible to political pressure post-revolution, as witnessed in the
high profile prosecution of American non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) workers in the spring of 2012.492 In that case, the
workers were accused of stoking unrest with foreign funding and
the court initially imposed a travel ban on the American defend-
ants. 49 3 The SCAF, acting in its capacity as the executive branch,
coerced the presiding judges to lift the travel ban due to political
pressure from the United States. 494 Similarly, critics suspected
undue SCAF influence on the SCC's decision to dissolve parlia-
ment as a broad remedy to its finding that some provisions of the
parliamentary election law were unconstitutional. 49 5
Thus, an HEC comprised solely of judges does not axiomatically
make the HEC immune from political interference that could
favor the dominant party. An alternative is to transform the HEC
into an independent, non-governmental elections commission
imparted with legal safeguards to protect against political interfer-
ence.4 96  Such a body, used in other comparable developing
nations,497 would lend legitimacy to the HEC as a neutral arbiter of
489. See supra Part III.B for a detailed discussion of the post-revolution changes to laws
governing the HEC.
490. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, GREATER TRANSPARENCY, supra note 141, at 3.
491. Id.
492. Egypt Appoints New Judges for Non-Profit Trial, USA TODAY (Mar. 4, 2012), http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-03/egypt-trial/53346840/1.
493. Id.
494. Ekram Ibrahim, Passing the Buck: Who Lified the Travel Ban on Indicted Foreign NGO
Workers? AHRAM ONLINE (Mar. 6, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/
36149/Egypt/0/Passing-the-buck-Who-lifted-the-travel-ban-on-indi.aspx.
495. Nathan J. Brown, The Egyptian Political System in Disarray, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR INT'L PEACE (June 19, 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/19/egyptian-
political-system-in-disarray/c073 (discussing the SCAF's political hand in the presidency,
the constituent assembly, the parliament, and the SCC).
496. See, e.g., Press Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary Statement, supra note 205.
497. Nations using an independent election commission include: South Africa, Austra-
lia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Poland. See South Africa: Independent Electoral
Commission, ELECTORAL INST. FOR SUSTAINABILITY DEMOCRACY AFR., http://www.eisa.org.za/
692013]
The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
the electoral process and shield judges from the trappings of
undue political interference in their work.
1. Judicial Elections Commissions Jeopardize the Judiciary's
Independence
Until 2007, Article 88 of the Egyptian Constitution mandated
that members of the judiciary supervise elections. 498 A 2007 consti-
tutional amendment created slots for politically appointed non-
judicial members in the HEC and PEC.4 99 Predictably, NDP politi-
cal appointees to these bodies controlled election supervision,
which resulted in an unprecedented level of unchecked fraud and
favoritism in the 2010 parliamentary elections.5 0 0  For these rea-
sons, one of the first demands of reformists after the revolution was
the removal of all political appointees from the elections
commissions.5 0
Some Egyptian analysts regard the transition of the HEC and
PEC from a quasi-judicial to a fully judicial body as a mixed bless-
ing.50 2 On the one hand, the judiciary is one of the few state insti-
tutions that retained a degree of public confidence and credibility
throughout the Mubarak years.503 On the other hand, judges have
not been immune from the executive's attempts to monopolize
WEP/souiec.htm (last updated Feb. 2011); Overview of the AEC, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL
COMM'N, http://www.aec.gov.au/about-aec/ (last updated Oct. 4, 2012); Sue Nelson, Elec-
tion Law Enforcement: International Comparisons, ELECTIONS CAN. (Mar. 2003), http://www.
elections.ca/res/eim/articlesearch/article.asp?id=59&lang=e&frmPageSize=; Electoral Sys-
tem of India, INDIAN ELECTIONS, http://www.indian-elections.com/electoralsystem/presi-
dentandvicepresident.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2013); ACEH, INDON., EUROPEAN UNION
ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION (2006-2007), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/human
rights/electionobservation/aceh/final-report en.pdf; INDEP. NAT'L ELECTORAL COMM'N,
http://www.inecnigeria.org/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013); Arab Spring Activists Observing
Poland's Election, EGYPT INDEP. (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/
503198.
498. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPr art. 88, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended
May 22, 1980. The complete supervision of elections byjudges was a result of a 2000 ruling
by the SCC. Case no. 11/13/Constitutional Court (Egypt). After state officials supervising
polling stations were convicted of fraud, the SCC held that only judges could supervise
every aspect of the elections, including polling stations. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at
27.
499. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 26-27.
500. INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL Sys., ELECTIONS IN EGYPT: KEY CHALLENGES FOR CRED-
IBLE AND COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS 6 (2011), available at http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publi-
cations/White-Papers/20 11 /-/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/
2011_egypt.briefing.paper.pdf.
501. Brown, supra note 100.
502. See id.
503. Id.
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power; past presidents have deployed various tactics to co-opt the
judiciary into their political agenda.5 0 4
The most powerful tool over the judiciary in the president's arse-
nal is the authority to appoint senior judges to the highest courts.
Unchecked political appointment of senior judges who in turn
appoint their deputies in a hierarchical judicial system com-
promises judicial independence.5 0 5 Indeed, Mubarak leveraged his
appointment authority to select judges more sympathetic to the
government's position in cases.506 In return for their loyalties,
Mubarak renewed their senior appointments and assigned them to
lucrative bureaucratic posts both during and after their judicial
careers.507 It is also worth noting that until the issuance of Law No.
142 of 2006, there was no independent line item in the national
budget for the judiciary.5os Instead, the judiciary's budget came
out of the Ministry of Justice's budget, further compromising the
independence of the judiciary.509
Similarly, judges appointed to the HEC or PEC receive attractive
bonuses that may further compromise their impartiality with
regard to the executive appointer.5s 0 As further evidence of a com-
promised judiciary, judges are debating the writing of a new law of
judicial organization that either amends or replaces, depending on
the version proposed, the notorious Judicial Authority Law No. 142
of 2006 so as to allow the judiciary to institutionalize its own con-
ception of full independence.5 1' Judges want a series of reforms
504. For example, President Nasser issued an executive decree that dismissed over 200
judicial officials, including the board of the Judges Association, some judges on the Court
of Cassation, and other key positions in various parts of the judicial system. MOUSTAFA,
supra note 64, at 65.
505. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 29.
506. Id. at 34.
507. Id. at 32; see also KHALIL ET AL., supra note 100, at 16 (recommending transferring
the authority to transfer, assign, or detail judges from the president to the High Judicial
Council); Dina Zayed, Egypt's Judges Shoulder Hopes for Democracy, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Nov. 2,
2011), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/02/1750 7 6.html.
508. KHALIL ET AL., supra note 100, at 16.
509. Id.
510. See id. at 24-25 (recommending transferring the authority to transfer, assign, or
detail judges from the president to the High Judicial Council); Zayed, supra note 507.
511. Ahmed Zaki Osman, Judicial Reform Hits a Bump as judges Propose Conflicting Draft
Laws, EGYPT INDEP. (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/judicial-
reform-hits-bump-judges-propose-conflicting-draft-laws (reporting that Ahmed Mekki's
draft law would amend Article 178 to transfer all the powers of the Minster ofJustice to the
SupremeJudicial Council, placing judicial affairs in the hands ofjudges whereas the minis-
ter is responsible solely for bureaucratic issues related to courthouses, such as construc-
tion, security, and non-judicial staff).
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that remove executive branch control of their affairs and institute a
more extensive separation of powers. 512
Post-revolution, many of these presidentially appointed senior
judges are on the HEC and PEC. In 2009, pursuant to Article 5 of
Law No. 1979, Mubarak appointed Faruq Sultan as the head of the
SCC, who also chaired the PEC.5 13 Sultan's service in the excep-
tional military courts, state security courts, the "court of ethics,"
placed him among the group ofjudges beholden to the regime. 514
Consequently, Sultan's appointment was seen as a political maneu-
ver by Mubarak to assure transfer of the presidency to his son.5 15
Similarly, the Justice Minister appoints, from among the judges
of the appeals courts, the presidents of the High Courts with the
approval of the High Judicial Council.516 Meanwhile, the most
senior judges on the High Judicial Council are appointed by the
president.517 This concentration of executive power in the
appointment of the most influential judges raises questions as to
the independence of the judiciary as a whole, notwithstanding the
independence of some individual judges.
Because the president's appointment authority has not changed
after the January 25 Revolution, except as it relates to the appoint-
ment of the chair of the SCC,5 18 no legal mechanism prevents
future presidents from using their authority to influence the HEC
and PEC to their party's advantage. 519 If Egyptians decide to retain
fully judicial elections commissions, then they should remove the
president's appointment powers altogether and allow the judges to
internally determine who heads the highest courts based on merit
512. Brown, supra note 119 ("Even the indirect ways of influencing judges, such as
doling out attractive secondments, would be placed in judicial rather than executive
branch hands. The effect would be to make the judiciary as a body far more autonomous
in terms of administration, budgeting, and personnel.").
513. David D. Kirkpatrick, New Turmoil in Egypt Greets Mixed Verdict for Mubarak, N.Y.
TIMES (June 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/world/middleeast/egypt-
hosni-mubarak-life-sentence-prison.html (reporting that lawyers and victims outside the
courtroom chanted, "The people want to cleanse the judiciary," upon hearing Mubarak's
sentence); Mark Lynch, Why Did the Egyptian Regime Appoint a New Chiefjustice?, FOREIGN
POL'Y (July 21, 2009), http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/21/whydidthe_
egyptian-regime-appoint-a_new chief justice.
514. In contrast to appointing other members of the SCC, the president has unfettered
discretion to appoint the president of the SCC. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 30.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 31.
517. Id. at 29.
518. Mona El-Nahhas, How Will It End?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY (Oct. 25-Nov. 31, 2012),
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1120/eg4.htm.
519. See KHALIL ET AL., supra note 100, at 11, 15 (concluding thatjudicial independence
requires thatjudges alone choose the heads of judicial councils and courts).
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and seniority. In the alternative, the president's judicial appoint-
ments should be subject to confirmation by the People's Assembly.
Regardless of the scheme adopted, the judiciary's legitimacy
hinges on the fairness and transparency of the elections monitor-
ing process. As the vice president of the Court of Cassation aptly
noted, "[t]he Judiciary must operate without any external influ-
ence, whether direct or indirect, that may weaken the resolve of its
members and lead them away from truth, whether through induce-
ment or compulsion, enticement or intimidation, threats or
promises."5 2 0
2. A Nontransparent Deliberation Process
Another significant flaw in the current HEC and PEC is their
lack of operational transparency. The HEC fails to consult political
parties and other electoral stakeholders before making decisions
that affect elections.521 For example, the HEC failed to consult
stakeholders before promulgating rules regulating the process for
registering party lists and coalitions. 522 In the 2011 elections, this
approach was at odds with the principle of open elections in which
citizens are the central actors for formulating electoral rules.5 2 3 At
the very least, citizens should have a meaningful opportunity to
comment on forthcoming changes to election rules before a final
agency decision is issued. 524
Egypt's laws, unlike those of countries such as Palestine, do not
mandate transparent elections.525 In fact, some of the provisions
of Law No. 73 of 1956 restrict transparency.5 26 For example, Arti-
cle 3(bis) (d) stipulates that " [d]eliberations of the HEC shall be
secret," while Article 35 states that the deliberations of the vote
counting committees "shall take place behind closed doors."5 27 In
contrast, supervisory bodies in other countries generally permit
stakeholders, the media, and observers to attend these sessions as it
enhances public confidence.5 2 8 As such, legislative reforms to Law
No. 73 of 1956 are necessary to promote transparency, bolster the
520. Id. at 21-22.
521. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, GREATER TRANSPARENCY, supra note 141, at 2.
522. Id. at 3.
523. Id.
524. Id.; see also NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INST., COLLOQUIUM ON AFRICAN ELECTIONS: BEST
PRACTICES AND CROSS-SECTORAL COLLABORATION 20 (2009) [hereinafter COLLOQUIUM ON
AFRICAN ELECTIONS] (citing similar recommendations for African governments).
525. DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT'L, GREATER TRANSPARENCY, supra note 141, at 3 & n.7.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. See id.
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HEC's independence, and educate voters about their rights in
elections.
In the case of the PEC, post-revolution reforms leave much to be
desired. Article 28 of the Interim Constitutional Declaration bars
the right to appeal a PEC decision, thereby vesting the PEC with
unchecked authority and immunity from erroneous decisions. 5 2 9
Reformers are rightfully concerned with avoiding a repeat of
Mubarak-era concentrations of power in a few judges who subjec-
tively rule in favor of a particular party.5 3 0 Such concerns are
heightened by allegations against then presiding chair of the PEC,
Farouk Sultan, of improperly supervising the 2009 elections of the
Lawyers' Syndicate to prevent Islamists from winning.53' Similarly,
the SCAF pressured the Court in March 2012 to reverse its ruling
barring American NGO employees from leaving Egypt pending
their trial for violating the NGO law.5 32 To the extent such con-
cerns about Sultan and other judges on the PEC are valid, similar
partiality could be exercised in presidential elections. Irrespective
of the validity of the specific charges above, concerns over the
inability to appeal PEC rulings are compelling. Therefore, new
election laws should be amended to provide a right of appeal to
the Supreme Court of Cassation.
3. The Need for an Independent Elections Commission Subject
to Judicial Review
Unless the law is reformed to curb the president's authority to
appoint judges, an independent, nonjudicial entity may be a bet-
ter option to preserve the legitimacy of elections. In addition to
the problems associated with the appointment process, judges are
not well suited for the tedious and politically charged tasks of
supervising polls, counting ballots, and announcing election
529. See Mara Revkin, Thousands of Islamists Rally in Tahrirto Denounce Former Regime Can-
didates, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/top-news-
thousands-islamists-rally-tahrir-denounce-former-regime-candidates (reporting protests
that ensued after the SCAF's revision of Article 28 of the Constitutional Declaration
because it stated that the PEC was not subject to judicial oversight and was immune to
appeal); Gamal Essam El-Din, Sting in the Tail, AL-AHRAMI WEEKLY ONLINE (Apr. 25-May 1,
2012), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1095/sc3.htm.
530. See Elbaradei Slams Immunity for Presidential Elections Commission, EGYPT INDEP. (Mar.
20, 2012), http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/elbaradei-slams-immunity-presiden-
tial-elections-commission; see also Kochan, supra note 33, at 906 (identifying the risk that a
post-nonviolent revolution regime may be very similar to the old regime).
531. See, e.g., El-Din, Legitimacy, supra note 384.
532. But see Ibrahim, supra note 494 (noting no government entity claimed responsibil-
ity for the reversal).
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results.53 3 Requiring them to engage in fundamentally political
activities undermines their role as neutral arbiters detached from
politics. Accordingly, Egypt should seriously consider creating an
independent elections commission whose decisions are subject to
independent judicial review.
The challenge, however, lies in ensuring the commissioners
retain their independence from undue legislative or executive
interference in light of Egypt's checkered record. Depending on
the model selected, Egypt can avoid repeating past mistakes that
impeded past elections from being free and fair. Egypt should
consider the following five models that scholars have identified for
independent elections commissions: (1) the independent model;
(2) the electoral branch model; (3) the mixed model; (4) the exec-
utive model; and (5) the judicial model.
The independent model would establish the election commis-
sion as independent of the executive and with its own budget. 5 3 4
The electoral model would designate the commission as a constitu-
tionally-recognized separate branch of government whose mem-
bers are appointed by the executive or legislative branch.535 The
mixed model would involve an independent board that determines
policy and an executive department that implements policy under
the supervision of the board.5 3 6 An election commission following
the executive model, on the other hand, is directed by a cabinet
minister as part of the executive branch with local government offi-
cials acting as agents of the central commission.537 Under the judi-
cial model, the election commission would be closely supervised by
and ultimately responsible to a special electoral court.5 3 8
The type of model best suited for Egypt depends on its unique
political circumstances and its history of authoritarianism. That
said, a number of factors will be essential to bolstering the commis-
sion's independence. First, the legal and financial framework
underpinning the election commission should guarantee its inde-
pendence.539 Second, the executive branch should select commis-
sioners through an inclusive and transparent process. Third, the
elections commission must regularly provide accurate information
533. Brown, supra note 119.
534. ALAN WALL ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, ELECTO-
RAL MANAGEMENT DESIGN: THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 6 (2008).
535. See id.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. See id. at 6-7.
539. COLLOQUIUM ON AFRICAN ELECTIONS, supra note 524, at 4.
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on the electoral process to the public. In particular, the commis-
sion should be proactive in ensuring accessibility to marginalized
groups such as the disabled, youth, and women. Finally, the elec-
tions commissions must expeditiously and transparently count,
tabulate, and announce election results, which should be amena-
ble to challenge through a complaint process that is timely, trans-
parent, and accessible to all voters. 540 Combined, these good
practices would contribute to a legitimate, credible, and indepen-
dent elections commission.
As a case study, Egypt should look to Ghana's experience.
Ghana's election commission has become an internationally recog-
nized exemplar based on its supervision of a series of free and
transparent elections. 5 4 1 Ghana uses the mixed model wherein the
president appoints the commission's seven commissioners in con-
sultation with the State Council of Ghana, a select group of elders
who advise the president on national issues. 5 4 2 The electoral com-
mission is a corporate entity with the capacity to acquire and own
property and to sue and be sued.5 43 The commissioners meet regu-
larly to make policy that is implemented by the chairman and the
commission's permanent staff.5 4 4 Ghana's electoral commission's
primary responsibilities include: 1) compiling and updating the
register of voters; 2) demarcating the electoral boundaries for
national and local government elections; 3) conducting and super-
vising all public elections and referenda; 4) educating the people
on the electoral process; and 5) leading initiatives to increase voter
registration. 5 4 5
Not only is Ghana's independent elections commission subject
to judicial review, but it also encourages and facilitates participa-
tion in the elections process from the entire country.54 6 Ghana's
election commission effectively engages all election stakeholders by
cultivating standing relationships with the media, political candi-
dates, political parties, religious leaders, security services, civil soci-
ety organizations, etc. 5 4 7 The election commission holds regular
meetings to reach a consensus and to discuss and review issues in
540. See id. at 21.
541. See id. at 1-2.
542. CONSTITUTION OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC OF GHANA 1992, ch. 43, 70.
543. ELECTORAL COMM'N OF GHANA, ELECTIONs 2004: GHANA'S PARLIAMENTARY AND
PRESIDENTIAL ELECIONs 7 (2005).
544. Id. at 5.
545. Id. at 3.
546. COLLOQUIUM ON ARICAN ELECTIONS, supra note 524, at 5.
547. Id.
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light of the stakeholders' opinions on national interest (for exam-
ple, on how to organize the elections to eliminate violence).548
The commission also organized candidate debates, working with
the media to determine debate questions based on the public's
input and to ensure broad coverage of the debates.549 These
efforts create a universal feeling of collaboration and accountabil-
ity that increases the credibility and transparency of the electoral
process, thereby decreasing tension and violence during elections.
Ghana also has a coalition of election observers and conducts a
statistical analysis of election results-known as parallel vote tabula-
tion-that prevents fraud and helps the public accept the
announced results, especially when one candidate wins by a close
margin.55 0 Egypt must take measures to re-legitimize the elections
process, and it can do so by increasing communication between,
and participation of, all stakeholders affected by the election, like
Ghana's elections commission has done.5 5 1
While the transition away from ajudicially run elections commis-
sion warrants more study and internal debate within Egypt, an
independent commission with its own budget and independent
staff is worth serious consideration. Egypt has a strong interest in
preserving the independence and legitimacy of its judiciary. Keep-
ing judges out of politics and the elections process is a necessary
prerequisite in meeting that objective.
C. Training Judges and Educating Voters
In contrast to Egypt's positive post-revolution amendments to
election laws, one adverse change is particularly noteworthy. Post-
revolution, the HEC no longer has the authority to educate voters
about the electoral process and their rights within it.552 In a highly
complex and tedious voting process, voter education is paramount
to ensure long-term voter turnout. For example, in both cham-
bers' elections, voters are required to cast at least three votes on
548. Id. at 7.
549. Id. at 7-8.
550. Id. at 11 (highlighting how helpful statistical analysis was in the legitimizing the
closeness of the margin in Ghana's 2008 elections).
551. Id.
552. Press Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary Statement, supra note 205; see also Final
Phase Completes Egyptian People's Assembly Elections, INT'L REPUBLICAN INST. (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/final-phase-completes-egyptian-peo-
ples-assembly-elections (recommending that the HEC make an effort to educate voters to
ensure that illiterate voters exercise their right to vote).
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two ballot papers.5 5 3 They must also split their votes between party
candidates at the local, district, and national level.55 4 By design,
many races go to a second round run-off, which leads to voter
fatigue and waning voter participation, as evinced in the second
round of the 2011 People's Assembly elections, where voter turn-
out dropped precipitously.5 5 5 For these reasons, either the HEC or
another body needs authorization and sufficient funding to proac-
tively educate voters, 33% percent of whom are illiterate,5 5 6 on how
to maneuver through Egypt's complicated election process.557
Likewise, the Egyptian government must inform voters of the
process for submitting electoral complaints. In the 2011 People's
Assembly elections, many Egyptians did not know how to access
complaint mechanisms, especially in the early election stages.558
Consequently, the deadline for submitting complaints was
extended by the courts, delaying the release of final election
results.559 Solving this problem requires either restoring the HEC's
authority or appointing another government entity to educate vot-
ers about the electoral process and its complaint procedures. Oth-
erwise, voters have no centralized government entity to turn to for
comprehensive information about the elections process, applicable
laws, and their rights as voters. While critics of Egypt's bureaucracy
raise legitimate concerns about its notorious record for poor pub-
lic service,560 a jurisdictional void for voter education makes voters
worse off.
553. ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 76, at 11.
554. Id.
555. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Turnout Falls as Egypt Casts RunoffBallots, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/middleeast/egyptian-runoffs-los-
ing-momentum.html; Ernesto Londono & William Wan, American Workers for Pro-Democracy
Organization in Cairo Take Shelter at U.S. Embassy, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/middleeast/low-turnout-in-second-phase-of-egyptian-vote/
2012/01/29/glQAlpLFaQ_story.html; see also, e.g., Press Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary
Statement, supra note 204 (noting the voter turnout for the People's Assembly exceeded
55%, while the Shura Council elections had less than a 14% turnout in the first round and
less than 7% turnout in the runoff rounds).
556. Egypt Statistics, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/egypt statistics.
html (last updated Feb. 21, 2003) (indicating a 66% adult (individuals over age fifteen)
literacy rate in a population of over 81 million).
557. See, e.g., Press Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary Statement, supra note 204.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. See Levinson, supra note 237 (mentioning the unreformed, unrestructured state
bureaucracy's ability to make one outcome more likely than others without directly dictat-
ing outcomes); CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 60 (noting that people seeking reme-
dies pushed for use of the legal system because the state bureaucracy is dysfunctional).
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Moreover, the complex and protracted nature of parliamentary
elections requires administrators to fully understand the new elec-
toral system in order to competently perform their oversight
responsibilities.5 6 ' With the reinstatement of full judicial supervi-
sion of the elections, judges are involved in the electoral process at
various levels. They serve as commissioners on the HEC, supervise
polling stations, and manage the candidate application and regis-
tration process. 56 2 As such, judges and election administrators
need proper training in supervising elections.563 At least one inter-
national election-monitoring group found the counting process in
the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections chaotic and inconsistent
across districts, in large part due to an absence of clear procedures
and training for supervising judges.564 Voters commonly reported
long lines and overcrowded voting precincts caused by a lack of
logistical coordination between supervising judges and security
personnel.565 Rather than argue against assigning a government
agency to educate voters and train elections administrators, time is
better spent assigning such an agency and improving its
performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of Egypt's checkered history with legal reform, it is too
soon to tell if the post-revolution reforms on paper will translate
into meaningful reforms in practice.56 6  Of particular concern is
the future role of the new dominant party, the Muslim Brother-
hood. If the past is prologue, Egyptians should remain vigilant in
preventing the Muslim Brotherhood from becoming the new NDP
whereby its control over the levers of power in the executive and
legislative branch make democracy unattainable for Egyptians.567
561. CHAZLI & CHAZLI, supra note 19, at 67.
562. Id. See Part IIl.B for a detailed discussion of judges' roles in the HEC.
563. CARTER CTR., supra note 299, at 11 (reporting that somejudges were neither prop-
erly nor uniformly trained in elections monitoring and ballot counting prior to the parlia-
mentary and presidential elections).
564. Press Release, Carter Ctr., Carter Center Witnessing Mission for Egypt's People's
Assembly Elections Executive Summary of Findings (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.
cartercenter.org/news/pr/egypt-01 1312.html.
565. Id.
566. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 187, at 2 (noting that Egyptian women have
had equal rights on paper since the 1956 Constitution, however, those rights have yet to be
realized in practice).
567. MOUSTAFA, supra note 64, at 78 (quoting Mustafa Khalil, prime minister from Oct.
1978-May 1980, as saying, "But a major problem was that the NDP, having the majority in
the People's Assembly, could push through any legislation it wanted and change the previ-
ous laws.").
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Rather than wait until the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other dom-
inant party, manipulates the laws to its advantage to pursue perpet-
ual dominance, Egyptians should make it clear their votes must be
earned and any improper meddling with the electoral system is
political suicide.
Towards that end, Egypt needs more structural reforms to pro-
mote free and fair elections monitored by independent supervisory
bodies. Going forward, the HEC and PEC must be restructured to
ensure independent oversight of parliamentary and presidential
elections. Recent moves to depoliticize the composition of the
PEC and to open the vote-tallying process to third party monitors
and party representatives are positive steps towards boosting the
credibility of elections results. More importantly, however, the
PEC and HEC must have a budget separate from the executive and
legislative branch and their decisions must be subject to judicial
review.
The underrepresentation of women and minority groups in par-
liament must also be addressed. 68 Post-revolution legislative
reforms fall short of establishing a transparent and accessible elec-
toral system that promotes women and minority representation in
government. Specifically, the SCAF revoked the sixty-four-seat
female candidate quota in the People's Assembly but did not
replace it with a viable alternative to promote female political par-
ticipation. This resulted in a significant decrease in women in the
2012 parliament.5 69 As such, a women's quota should be reinstated
to ensure greater women representation in parliament. In the
alternative, all political parties should be required to alternate
between male and female candidates on their party list.
Likewise, political parties must engage Coptic candidates and, in
districts where Copts comprise more than 10% of the population,
parties should be required to place a Copt in one of the top three
slots on their party list. This measure should be implemented
simultaneously with prohibitions on gerrymandering districts to
dilute the Coptic vote. Without such remedial measures, Copts will
continue to be underrepresented in the Egyptian Parliament.
By removing control over elections monitoring from the execu-
tive branch and placing it squarely under the purview of the judici-
568. See, e.g., Press Release, Carter Ctr., Preliminary Statement, supra note 205 (recom-
mending a quota that ensures at least 30% of the parliament consists of women); see also
Kochan, supra note 33, at 904 (explaining that it is essential to protect the rights of minori-
ties, especially when building a constitution).
569. Garcia-Navarro, supra note 256.
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ary, the post-revolution amendments shift Egypt's electoral
framework towards a more transparent and independent process.
That said, Egyptians should transition the HEC from a purely judi-
cial entity to an independent, non-governmental elections commis-
sion. Despite Egyptians' trust in their judiciary, judges have not
been immune from improper executive interference in the past.
Through appointments of senior judges to the highest courts and
assignments to lucrative bureaucratic posts, the executive branch
can compromise the independence of the judiciary. Moreover,
placing judges in the line of fire for political disputes exposes them
to politicization and a loss of independence.5 7 0
To the extent the HEC and PEC will remain judicially run,
supervising judges need better training to manage the electoral
process and coordinate with security personnel to ensure transpar-
ent and organized voting. At the grassroots level, voters must be
educated about the electoral process and the procedures for filing
complaints about voting irregularities. Increased voter awareness is
a valuable mechanism for protecting against fraud and other elec-
tion irregularities. Furthermore, the rule-making procedures of
the HEC should be more transparent, allowing input from electo-
ral stakeholders such as political parties and civil society organiza-
tions before new rules are issued. Amendments to Articles 3(bis)
and 35 of Law No. 73 of 1956 requiring the vote tallying process be
made open to third-party monitors and party representatives would
go a long way towards this end.
Furthermore, the SCAF's adoption of a mixed proportional
party representation and independent candidate winner-take-all
system marks another substantial advance in the promotion of civic
engagement by minority groups, when compared to the previous
electoral regime. The mixed system using a "closed list" process
simultaneously weakens the significance of individual candidates,
including NDP partisans, and empowers political parties to effec-
tively determine who will stand in parliamentary elections.571 The
lack of a vibrant political sphere over the past thirty years makes it
likely that, in the short-term, well-organized Islamist parties will
fare well under proportional representation, and well-connected
citizens and political partisans from the previous regime will win
570. For example, prior to 2007, judges oversaw elections but even then the executive
branch manipulated the judiciary using the judges' prestige to legitimate sham elections,
causing a controversy within the Judge's Club. Brown, supra note I19.
571. Egyptian Military Amends Controversial Election Law, supra note 234.
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most of the independent candidate seats.5 72 Indeed, the results
from the 2011 election of the People's Assembly confirm this out-
come. Egypt's Islamist parties, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom
and Justice Party and the Salafi Al-Nour Party,5 73 combined to
secure 356 seats, or 71.47% of all seats, in the People's Assembly. 5 7 4
Additionally, former members of Hosni Mubarak's NDP running
as independent candidates, won fifteen seats, or 10% of all seats
allotted through the independent candidate winner-take-all sys-
tem.5 7 5 Thus, this mixed election model has its limitations in
bringing in new political players into the fold.
Notably, many ambiguities in the electoral laws remain
unresolved. For instance, while the amended version of Law No.
38 of 1972 envisions the formation of political coalitions, it does
not provide any detail on how coalitions can be registered.576 Law
No. 38 of 1972 also fails to specify how votes garnered by a coali-
tion will be distributed among the coalition's various political par-
ties.57 7 This information is necessary to determine which specific
parties meet the minimum number of votes needed for a parlia-
mentary seat. Without a clear and accessible coalition-forming pro-
cess, smaller parties are disadvantaged because they rely on
coalitions to pool their resources to compete against the larger par-
ties for seats in the parliament.5 78 Thus, political disputes among
coalition members seeking a seat in the parliament are inevitable.
In the end, Law No. 38 deters formations of coalitions, thereby dis-
favoring smaller parties.
One year after their historic revolution, Egyptians have made
great strides towards a transition from entrenched authoritarian-
572. BAsSIOUNI, supra note 133, at 16; see also Kochan, supra note 33, at 906 (stating that
after a nonviolent revolution, too often the replacement regime is similar to the displaced
regime).
573. For more information about the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice
Party, see Kristen Stilt, "Islam Is the Solution": Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 73 (2010). For more information about the Salafi Al Nour
Party, see Jonathan Brown, Salafis and Sufis in Egypt, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE
(Dec. 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/20/salafis-and-sufis-in-egypt/8fj4.
574. Agence France-Presse, Egypt's Islamists Win Parliamentary Elections, RAw STORY (an.
21, 2012), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/01/21/egypts-islamists-win-parliamentary-
elections.
575. Aya Batrawy, Egypt Elections 2012: Islamists Secure 75 Percent of Parliament, HuF-
FINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/21/egypt-elec-
tions-2012-islamists n_1220801.html.
576. Law No. 38 of 1972 (Concerning the People's Assembly), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 28
Sept. 1972 (Egypt).
577. Id.
578. Id. art. 15.
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ism to a democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and
religious norms. The key to their success will be whether post-
revolution reforms are structural, in the sense that they produce a
complete upheaval of a corrupt political system as called for by
most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise
of reform. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one
thing has become quite clear-future political leaders who seek to
impose authoritarianism do so at the risk of triggering another
revolution.

